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For A BramwellRevival
A. EPSTEIN*
by RICHARD

I. One of a Great Breed
All too often the nineteenthcenturyis a victim of oversimplification
if not mischaracterizationat the hands of its twentieth century critics.
Startingwith the realist movement, there has been a pervasive belief that
prior to our own times judges were naive about their social roles and
about the necessity of appealing to broad first principles to decide concrete cases, whether they wished to or not. Instead, these judges were
either transfixedby some naive Blackstonianbelief that law was "found"
but not "made"or relied on some "mechanical"rule to decide cases that
cried out for some more rigorousdefense as a matterof policy.'
In my view, this caricatureof the nineteenthcentury rings false to
anyone who has spent time readingthe original opinions of the greatjustices, both English and American,who graced the common law. While it
is certainly open to the modem critics of nineteenthcentury to disagree
with the results reached by earlierjudges, and the reasons that they gave
for them, it is, I think, a serious misreadingof historyto assume that these
judges were unable to formulate the substantive grounds for their decisions in clear and powerful language. Often, these judges were motivated
by philosophies that are out of fashion today, and, broadlyspeaking, they
observed strict limits on the judicial function that might seem a bit too
fastidious in our more freewheeling times.2 It is all too often a pity that
nineteenthcenturythinkersare seen chiefly throughthe eyes of the twentieth century detractors,on and off the bench. But there is much to learn
from the greatest judges of the nineteenth century-Parke, Bowen,
Blackburn, Jessel, and Herschell in England; Kent, Shaw, Holmes (of
Massachusetts),Cooley, and Mitchell in the United States-just by reading them.
In this lofty company, one judge who stands out today is Baron
George Bramwell, the outlines of whose careerI have summarizedin my
*James ParkerHall Professorof Law, The University of Chicago. I have writtenthis article at the request of David Abrahamand Anita Ramasastry,both of whom independently
divined my affection of the late Baron Bramwell.I should like to thankIsaac Barchasfor his
researchassistance,and his carefulreadingof the manuscript.
1. For statementsof this sort, see Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM.
L. REV. 605 (1908); JEROMEFRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
2. For one of countless examples of the conflict, see e.g., MacDonald v. General
Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876) with the President and Directors of GeorgetownCollege v.
Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) where the formerdefends and the latterattacks the
charitableimmunityof hospitals in the provision of care. The lateropinion is certainlymore
ingenious and thoroughthan the former,but it is hardlycorrectfor thatreason.
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brief introductionto this symposium.3Bramwell is unusual even for the
laissez fairejudges of his own time because of his coherentand unstinting
devotion to a set of broadpolitical principlesthat animatedhis day-to-day
legal work. While some of his contemporaries,like Blackburn,may have
had a broaderhistorical sweep of subject matter,4and others like Bowen,
a keener sense of the wise aphorism,5few, if any, had Bramwell's strong
sense of the theoreticalfoundationof legal rules, or his ability to make a
forthrightstatementof his position as an integralpartof his judicial work.
The very clarity and power of his sometimes incautious expression
made him the most convenient judicial foil of reformersand critics of a
latterage.
As was the case with Thomas Hobbes, one could disagree with
Bramwell, but one could never doubt where he stood. In their disagreement, the critics were often dismissive of Bramwell, or at least of the
philosophical foundations of his world view. Sir William Holdsworth
wrote of him that "He never realized that the simple application of the
laissez faire principle gave no solution to the social and economic problems of the new industrialage."6But why? Writing a half a centurylater,
PatrickAtiyah was quite eager to condemn Bramwell as "somethingof a
fanatic"for his devotion to the principleof freedomof contract,while taking evident pleasurein attackingBramwell for his naivete aboutthe major
social and political questions of our time.7 For a long time, these slights
were gratuitous.The many years between Bramwell's death and Margaret
Thatcher'srise to power did nothing to reverse what Bramwell regarded
as a dangerousslide towardcollectivism. It was easy for the leading academic lawyers of subsequent generations to establish a new mainstream
that left Bramwell's thought strandedhigh and dry. There was little reason to attack Bramwell, because there was no one who really cared to
come to his defense. It was quite enough to point out the sins of his
thoughtto knowing nods of approvalfrom bench and bar alike.
To be sure, Bramwell's intellectualposition was far from invulnerable and, at times and in certain ways, his defense of laissez faire was too
extreme. Later, I shall argue that his major weakness stemmed from his
failure to systematically incorporateinto his world view a response to
problems of collective action and public goods-for indeed, the correct
response to these issues is not easily meshed with thoroughgoinglaissez
3. RichardA. Epstein, Baron Bramwell at the End of the TwentiethCentury,40 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. (1994).
4. See, e.g., his opinions in Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866); Taylor v.
Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 310 (Ex. 1863).
5. "[T]he state of a man' s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digest. It is true thatit
is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particulartime is, but if it can be
ascertainedit is as much a fact as anythingelse." 29 Ch. 459 (1885)
6. 15 W.S. HOLDSWORTH,HISTORYOF ENGLISHLAW 501 (1927).
7. PATRICKATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOMOF CONTRACT377
(hereaftercited as "ATIYAH,RISE AND FALL")
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faire principles of private property and free contract. But, Bramwell's
shortcomingspale into insignificance relative to those of his critics, who
remain blissfully unaware of the weaknesses in their own rival conceptions of a sound legal order.On balance, he should be rememberedfor his
distinctive strengthsand not beratedfor his failings. He deserves his place
with the greatestEnglishjudges of his own time, which is to say with the
greatestcommon law judges of all time.
Can anythingbe done to revive the reputationof one of the giants of
the bench? I hope that it can. Accordingly, my purposein this articleis to
offer some modest defense of Bramwell's substantivelegal positions on
many issues, and then expose what I take to be the theoreticalweakness
of his position which, in part,accountsfor some of the unsatisfactoryportions of his work. I propose to achieve this goal by looking at his judicial
output, and to some extent, his nonjudicial writings, by field of inquiry.
Bramwell was on the bench for over 35 years and left his mark on most
importantareas of law. Ratherthan follow his work chronologically,it is
instructiveto look at it thematically.
The first section examines Bramwell's view on the freedom of contract,and defends him againstthe chargethathe was an uncriticaldevotee
of the principleand blind to its limitations.As partof that defense, I shall
also respond to the common charge of his critics that he ignored the fundamental background social inequalities that in their view decisively
underminethe moral authorityand economic use of contractualfreedom.
In doing so, I shall examine Bramwell's interestingviews of the relationship between contractand textual interpretation.Finally, I shall cast a few
stones at his critics, and indicate why their views of contractlaw turnout
to be far less sophisticatedthanhis.
The second section deals with Bramwell's treatmentof the law of
quasi contract,especially as it relates to principles of fraud and mistake
and to the law of contractgenerally. Once again, I examine both his judicial opinions and his nonjudicial writings, and defend him against the
charge this his devotion to freedom of contractblinded him to the importantrole thatquasi-contractplayed in the overall scheme of the law.
The third section switches focus to tort. The examination of tort
begins with a defense of Bramwell's view of strict liability in tort. It then
continues with a discussion of his views on assumptionof risk, which link
up closely with his views on contractand legislation generally. Whatever
the weaknesses in the details of Bramwell's exposition, he understoodthe
main point so often forgotten today: that contract should trumptort, not
the other way around.
The fourth section of the project concerns Bramwell's response to
collective action, coordination,and public goods problems. It is here that
his performanceis most uneven. At one level, his theoreticalgrasp of the
issue, as revealed in his remarkabledecision in Bamfordv. Turnley,8was
8. 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1862).
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unrivaledfor his time, not only for lawyers but economists as well. Yet, at
one level, he unnecessarilylimited his analysis to the law of nuisance,and
he did not see the broad range of issues to which it could be usefully
applied.
The fifth section compares Bramwell's view with the responsible
modem critique of laissez faire, which seeks to meld a use of market
institutions with responsible forms of government redistribution of
income or wealth, and argues that Bramwell's pessimism on this question
has been born out by the failure of modern reforms. The Liberty and
PropertyDefence League may not have had all the answers to its critics,
but much of its programrests on a core of good sense that we would well
be advised to follow today.
II. Contracts
A. TheSanctityof Contractin a Worldof BackgroundInequalities.
The bedrock assumptionin Bramwell's world view was that voluntary arrangementsbetween individuals should be enforced by the law
without regard to the substantive terms of the agreement. Individuals,
Bramwell never tired of saying, knew their own interestsbetterthan anyone else and could be counted on to protectthose interestsfar betterthan
any self-anointed or publicly-appointedguardian.The office of the state
was to protectthe spheresof individualliberty and thereafterto leave people alone to do what they choose with what they own. When ordinary
commercialengagementsturnout poorly, the partiesmust live with whatever terms they set for themselves. The systematicgains from a regime of
strong contracts should not be undermined by judicial sympathy for a
loser in his time of need.
The sanctityof the bargainwas thus the pole starin Bramwell'sjudicial heavens. He rigorously applied this principle to all persons without
regardto fear or favor. In the early stages of his career,the insistence that
all persons were alike before the law was seen as a progressiveelement.
Prior political theory had implied that legal advantage might rightly be
given to persons who were favoredwith fortuneand power. After all, one
of the most divisive issues of nineteenthcentury English politics was the
reform acts, which by degrees slowly took England to a position of universal suffrage by the end of World War I. That outcome would have
been quite unthinkablewhen Queen Victoria ascended the throne some
years before. But Bramwellhad no truckwith any notions of that sort. For
him, all contractswere alike and of equal dignity:if a rich personmade an
improvidentbargain,he was not disposed to twist the law to let him out of
it. The position of blind and equal justice was for him an evident antidote
to privilege and power. But as the nineteenthcenturydrew to a close, the
dominant view was that the law had to take into account differences in
background conditions and social class in dealing with the ravages of
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urbanizationand industrialization.Now that claims of established privilege had been rooted out, in part by people like Bramwell himself, the
newer agenda wanted to provide small merchantsand individual workers
some offsetting legal advantages against the newly emergent industrial
behemoths.
Bramwell's commitment to this neutral view of contract law has
earned him almost universal academic condemnation. Professor Ramasastry quotes the historian Daniel Duman, whose critique of Bramwell
assumes familiar lines: "For Bosanquet and Bramwell, as much as for
Blackstone, the ideal was equal justice for all. They failed to realize,
though not out of malice, that inherentsocial inequality largely nullified
the concept of equality before the law."9 Abrahampursues exactly the
same line, for he thinks that ignoring the disparate background social
positions of the contractingpartiesgeneratesan empty and formalbody of
contractlaw.
This Whig conception of liberty as a function of propertyand expressed in contact was bothformal and negative. .. Althoughthe point cannotbe arguedhere, it
is safe to say that any contract-basedconception of liberty must remain formal.
Ignoringbackgroundinequalities among the contractingparties is to ignore what
probablyanimatesthem and, in regardto the public sphere, constitutesa regression from the Jeffersonianposition.10

Later on, he accuses Bramwell of an implicit class by bias for his
(that is Bramwell's) refusal to recognize the limitations on contractual
neutrality. "Now, it is characteristicof ruling classes that they identify
their own interestsas the general interestand the interestof other classes
as narrowself-interest."11
Professor Abraham (whose views on this point are not shared by
Professor Ramasastry)thus treats the sins of Bramwell's formalism as
more or less beyond argument, which is a pity because they make
Bramwell suffer from a bum rap. His insistence on formal conceptions of
contractualjustice was no covert effort to give the edge to his own side. In
fact, he had no side and he had no friends, save his own principleswhich could gore any ox, even his own. Nor did Bramwell's principles
call for "formalism"for its own sake, independent of the overall good
9. DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIALBENCH IN ENGLAND 1727-1875, 104 (1982).
Ramasastryendorses that position. "As Duman points out, if one looks at freedom of contract in light of the inherent social disparities that existed, then the whole notion of legal
equality rings hollow." RAMASASTRY at 330. Yet her agreementon this point should not
be taken as an excessively critical view of Bramwell, for she also notes that "freedomof
contract may have been constrainingwith regard to the substantiveoutcomes of his cases
while simultaneouslyserving overall as a progressive and liberatingforce in the reform of
the common law as a process." RAMASASTRY at 330. She thus parts company with the
usual monolithiccondemnationof his work. "Bramwell'slife and careertake on a complexity that is noticeably absent from the conventional static and unified account of his work."
RAMASASTRY at 329 I agree with her estimationthat as to the long term benefits of freedom of contractas an instrumentof social reform,but do not think that thereis some implicit price that has to be paid in the treatmentof individualcases.
10. ABRAHAM at 315-318.
11. Id. at 39.
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they produced for society at large. Bramwell's view was that social
advancement did not come from large scale political movements that
sought to alter the terms of trade or to redistributethe spoils of the productive labor.Rather,progresscame from hardwork and patientadvancement, where contractwas the majorinstrumentwhich allowed all persons
to pursuetheir own lives in harmonywith the plans of other individuals.
So understood, Bramwell's position easily weathers the criticisms
brought to bear against it. Begin with the first charge against his formal
system: bargainsbetween unequalsmust always work to the disadvantage
of the weaker, such that legal interventionis requiredto redressthe resulting inequality.To place this chargein perspective,it is criticalto note that
Bramwell, like all good libertarians, accepts defenses to contractual
enforcementthat are based on duress, which covers both the threator use
of force and the refusal to honor prior contractualobligations. He also
protects infants and insane persons against the ostensible contracts that
they sign. So, it is not his position that all contractshave to be enforced,
and the ones that he filters out of the system are those that no one should
wish to enforce-namely agreementsfrom which one side wins and the
other side loses. Yet here too, all is without fear or favor: the rich can be
victims of duress as well as its practitioners.No a priori conclusions are
allowed to determinewho has the whip hand in any transaction.
The question,however, is whetherthe win/lose outcomes avoided by
the conventional contract defenses are plausible renditions of the world
whenever the only objection to a contractualunion is the difference in
wealth or social position of the two parties to the contract. To restate
Bramwell's position in somewhat more modem terms, the difference in
wealth or social position of the two partiesto the contractdo not prevent
agreements between the parties from being win/win arrangements,
judged, of course, at the time of contractformation,not at the time of disagreement.Let us suppose that A has wealth equal to 1 and B has wealth
equal to 1000. B now proposes a contractto A in a setting in which force,
deception, and incompetenceare not in evidence. Is there any reasonwhy
A should accept that agreementif his wealth is reducedbelow 1? Any reason to believe that he would? A has the capacity to just say no, and will
do that out of his own self-interestno matterwhetherB has wealth equal
to 1 or 1,000. So long as A cannot be forced by B to any position below
his prior state of affairs, where is the "exploitation"of social position that
calls forth confident condemnationof this voluntary transaction?Never
lose sight of the main point: unless people believed thatthere were mutual
gains from ordinary contracts, why would they make them, and why
would the law choose to enforce their promises? One could try to appeal
to some moral theory of promising,but that theory would ring hollow in a
world where no one could see the point of the practice.12Ordinarymorality sets its stamp of approvalon promising-and, for that matter,chooses
to condemn the enforcementof promises that are obtained by fraud and
12. As it does in PatrickAtiyah'slittle volume on contacttheory,see infra at note 23.
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duress or from incompetentsand the like-because it perceives the gains
from trade that typically emerge from voluntary agreements. Simply
showing a disparity in wealth does nothing to negate the expectation of
joint improvementfrom exchange. If joint gain is what drives the social
acceptanceof contractamong equals, then why not among those who are
not equals? Contract is thus the road to advancement for the poor, a
source of upward mobility. It is pointless and mischievous to close it
down out of a misguided sympathy for their position. If only the advocates of the minimumwage understoodthe damage that they wreaktoday
on the very persons they wish to help!
A more sophisticatedversion of this argumentcould stress a second
point, one not usually raised by Bramwell's critics, but which deserves
some brief comment nonetheless. Here, the argumentis that while both
sides share in the gain from contract (thereby conceding that the strong
charge of exploitation is false), nonetheless the division of the gains is
unfairin that the rich person will get the lion's shareof the benefit. Once
again, the criticismfails. To begin with, the chargeis really quite benign if
the rich personputs ten times as much into the deal as the poor person,for
then an equal rate of return on investment can be obtained only if he
retains a larger percentageof the surplus,and if the bargainso provides,
who is in a position to object? But there is nothing which says that B will
do better on the division of surplus than A: the reverse could easily be
true. All too often, it is easy to misperceive who has the "power"in negotiations. If B has more wealth and more at stake, then he has more to lose.
A may lose a day's wages in the field, but B could see his entire crop rot
for want of a timely harvest.Who has the leverage here? Hardto say without a detailedknowledge of the contractualstrategiesand business alternatives open to each: but thatis just the point, for no facile condemnationof
contractson this groundworks either. The great advantageof a regime of
contract is that we are more likely to see the crops harvested than rot.
Bramwell's instinct is sound when he writes, as Abrahamquotes: be more
concerned with producing "the largest pile," and not with its distribution.13To many this sounds harsh,but it is not. The pile is not just given,
but has to be made. You cannotredistributewhat you did not produce.
B. Contractand Regulation.
Bramwell's general views on the question of contract were well in
accordwith the dominantpolitical sentimentsof his times. The difficulties
that both he and his colleagues on the bench faced had to do with the
interactionbetween contractand regulation,and with the clash between a
principle in which he devoutly believed and a set of statutory rules to
which he took the strongestpossible exception. On questions like this, a
13. Abrahamat 62. For furtherdiscussion see infra at 300, quoting Bramwell, as attributed to him by Fairfield, in his biographyof Bramwell completed shortly after Bramwell's
death. CHARLESFAIRFIELD,SOME ACCOUNT OF GEORGEWILLIAMWILSHERE
BARON BRAMWELLOF HEVERAND HIS OPINIONS252 (1898).
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charge of fanaticism, such as the lodged against Bramwell, surely has
room to operate.It is always temptingto ignore the statuteand to enforce
the contract,as if Parliamentnever had the last say on anything.
Yet oddly enough, it is on the question of the interactionbetween
contractsand regulationthat one often saw Bramwell at his best, even in
those cases where he held that the contractual provision survived the
superimposedscheme of statutoryregulation.Two cases, decided abouta
quartera centuryapart,show somethingof his reasoning.
In Archer v. James,14the plaintiff was an artisan who constructed
heels for 7d (pence) per dozen. As partof his contract,the defendantsupplied the plaintiff with certain equipment-a frame, machine, stands,
windings, and the like-at a figure of 3s 9d per week (or 45 pence), which
were deductedfrom the money that was otherwisepayableto the plaintiff.
The question was whetherthis contractualarrangementwas in violation of
the so-called Truck Acts-with "truck" as in "barter or otherwise
exchange"-which required the employer to pay the worker "lawful
money for all their lawful wages," undera sanction of treble damages for
that portionof the wages that were not so paid. The original statuteidentified the abuse associatedwith paymentin kind as one that "in the occupations of clothmaking,the labourersthereof have been driven to take great
part of their wages in pins, girdles, and other unprofitablewares, under
such price that it did not extend to the extent of their lawful wages." The
obvious abuse against which this statute could be addressed is a case
where the employeroriginallypromiseswages in cash and then substitutes
as paymentthe very produceof the labor,producewhich to the laborerhas
a value equal to only a fractionof the cash forgone. The questionhere was
whetherthe prohibitionof the statuteextendedto the set up charges.
In the Exchequer the case divided two to two, with Pollock, C.B.,
joining Bramwell in favor of upholding the contractand Keating, J., and
Byles, J., taking the opposite position. The issue here is technical and
close: it could surely be arguedwith Keatingand Byles that any benefit to
the laborer was a substitute for cash and therefore was a payment in
wages. In effect, the employerpromisedto pay 7d per dozen pins and then
reduced these wages by offering the equipmentfor 3s 9d, as the statute
prohibited.
Bramwell took a very differentview of the case, and one that merits,
at the very least, close attentionfor it shows a certain level of statutory
inventiveness that is not normally associated with conservative judges.
But it is hardlythe work of any fanatic.He startswith the observationthat
[I]f the words were plain, it would be irrelevantto inquireas to the object or policy of the Legislature--our duty would be simply to declare what we found enacted. But there is a doubt as to the meaningof the language, in orderto solve which

it is properto inquireintotheprobableobjectandpolicyof thestatue.15

Hardly a silly position. Bramwell next asked the purposes for which
14. 121 Eng. Rep. 998 (Ex. 1862).
15. 121 Eng. Rep. at 1006.
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the Truck Act might have been enacted and notes that, for example, "an
employer of labourmay engage a man to work for him, with a promise of
apparentlyfair wages, part or all in goods, and then cheat him by giving
him inferior goods overcharged."16Alternatively,he may use the system
to get the worker into debt in order to exert control over him. But
Bramwell sees no nefariouspurposein the currentscheme. The laboreris
not requiredto accept inferior goods at an inflated valuation;nor is there
any effort to force indebtednessas the laboreris able to work more than
the number of hours needed to pay off the total amount of the fixed
indebtedness. So, in Bramwell's view, the wages are not equal to a sum
obtainedby multiplyingthe 7d by the hours worked. Wages are that sum
less the fixed amountof money paid for the equipmentnecessary to perform the labor.He then notes that the questionof constructionof wages is
close, but that the Truck Act "ought not to be interpretedloosely, more
especially as it makes an infringementof its provisionsa crime."
The economics of the situation certainly entered into Bramwell's
calculations and in a productive way. One way to avoid the Truck Act
was to furnish the equipmentfor free and then to pay a lesser sum-5d
was the number put in argument-for each dozen heels made. A quick
calculation should make it evident that if the laborermade 22 1/2 dozen,
then the net amountreceived for the work would be the same as 4 1/2d.
But, the question is not to find a single outputat which the employer and
the laborerare indifferentas to the form of payment. It is to identify the
best set of incentives that can be used to the advantage of both sides.
Here, it is clear that the actualmethodadoptedin the tradeis preferableto
the alternative method-unquestionably legal-that has been proposed.
The key point is that the marginalvalue of each dozen pins is 7d, not 5d,
and only the chosen price schedule, complete with set off, reflects those
differences. Thus, the uniform 5d figure leaves the employer at risk that
the laborerwill slack off and producea small outputand still make a profit, even though he has consumed resources-the set up-that he has not
fully paid for. Surely a situationin which he makes one dozen heels and
receives a net pay of 5d when the social value of his product(allowing for
set up costs) is negative 3s, 2d, is not desirable.(It is not negitive 3s, 4d,
because of the marginthe value of the first dozen equals 7d.)
The distortions in the system are not confined to cases where the
laborer works too little; they also apply where the laborer works too
much. To be sure, once 22 1/2 dozen heels have been made, the net payments are the same underthe two systems, but the marginalincentives are
not: the laborerhas an incentive to produce more heels at 7d per dozen
then he does at 5d per dozen, which is what the chosen compensationformula allows, and for the benefit of both sides. Once the incentives are
understood,the choice is clear: a literal reading of the statutecreates an
odd set of incentives, and counteractsno known abuse. A more expansive
readingof the term 'wages' avoids the substantivedifficulties, but at some
16. Id. at 1006.
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cost to strictcanons of statutoryconstruction.It is hardto fault Bramwell
for choosing that second alternative,especially in a criminalcase.
A similarproblemabout the interactionof statuteand contractarises
in a case of which both Abraham17 and Ramasastryl8 make much:
Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway Company v. H. W.
Brown.19There, a fishmongerhad enteredinto a contractwith the railroad
to ship his fish for a one-fifth reductionin price if he waived liability "for
any loss or delay in transitor from whatever other cause arising."When
the fish were spoiled in transit,he sued for their destructionjust as if he
had paid the higherprice for the coverage. The case would have been easy
for all the members of the House of Lords if the only question was
whether the fishmonger was bound by his contractat common law. But,
the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854 provided that any exemption
from liability for loss or damage to goods attributableto "the Neglect or
Default"of the company was void unless the provision "shallbe adjudged
by the Courtor Judge before whom any Questionrelatingthereto shall be
tried to be just and reasonable.. . "20The question was whetherthis particular waiver satisfied this condition, and a unanimouscourt held that it
had.
What is strikingabout Bramwell's opinion is his effort to envision a
set of circumstancesin which the waiver in questionmight be regardedas
unreasonable,and he hits a neat example when he writes:
[I]f, for instance, where a company were entitled to charge ?100 for the carriage of a thing they took off 5s. upon the footing of their being exempted from
all responsibility,that peradventurea man who had enteredinto thatcontractwith
them might say, 'No, I have discovered that 5s. which you have let me off is not
an equivalent,nor anythinglike an equivalentfor the loss which I sustainby your
getting rid of your responsibility.'"21

Here, Bramwell foreshadows the modern point that railroadsmight
seek to avoid regulatoryprice ceilings by giving insufficient reductions
for waivers of liability-agreements that shippers will still enter into
because they are willing in general to pay more than the establishedtariff
for the shipment.
Baron Bramwell's opinion is, however, not usually rememberedfor
this passage, but more for his stern injunctionthat the fishmongerhad to
live by his waiver. But once again, his argument is completely sound.
Bramwell's point is that there is no risk of exploitation as in the above
example because the railroadoffered both modes of shipment, with and
without liability. The power to avoid exploitationlay in the acceptanceof
the general terms. It was only after laying this groundworkthat Bramwell
17. ABRAHAM, mss. at 311.
18. RAMASASTRY, mss. at 336-340.
19. 8 A.C. 703 (H.L.E. 1883).
20. 217 & 18 Vict. c. 31, ?7.
21. Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway Co. v. Brown, 8 A.C. at 717, duly
quoted by Ramasastry, who, characteristically,does not so much defend his decision, as
insist that it be put in the largerperspectiveof his overall work.
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unleashes a characteristicattackon the temerityof the fishmonger.
The argumentcomes to this: the allowance is so just and reasonableto all fish
dealers that it is unjustand unreasonableto each of them. Well, one has hearda
great many discussions about free will, but I protest that this is a novelty-I
never heardanythinglike it before-it is the most extraordinarypropositionthat
I ever heard in my life. The assumptionthat he is obliged to do it because he
cannot otherwisecompete with his fellow-fishmongersis the most gratuitousone
that was ever inventedin this world.22

Perhaps we should fault Bramwell for his hyperbole, for certainly
worse legal argumentshave been made. However,his overall conclusionis
undoubtedlycorrect, even with the statutoryrequirementof just and reasonable contacts. Suppose that the Railway had removed the waiver
option, and told the fishmongerto ship for the full price with the full liability or not at all. Then, howls of protest would eruptif that contractwere
accepted, and the goods safely delivered. A huffy fishmonger would
demand a refundof some portionof the price because he really preferred
to take the risk at the lower price, naturallyenough, to effectively compete.
The blunt truthis that this fishmongerfaced the same schedules and the
same tariffs as his rivals, and if he cannot compete, it is because his other
costs exceed those of this rivals. Why then should he be the darlingof the
law, relative to others who have managed their affairs better? Allowing
recoveryhere is a straightand undeservedsubsidyof free insurance.
C. Turningon Bramwell's Critics
I shall not go throughany of Bramwell's other contractopinions at
this moment and will happilyconcede thatthey may be wrong on point of
detail. But before leaving the question of contract, it is worth at least a
few words to comment on the substantiveapproachof his critics. It is not
enough just to dispose of freedom of contract. Something has to be
offered up in its place, and the question is what. Patrick Atiyah, for his
part,comes up with the novel suggestion that it would be wise to back off
the rule that allows legal enforcementof fully executorycontracts.23After
all, the modem theories of detrimentalreliance allow the enforcementof
promises when considerationand mutualityare lacking, so why not make
reliance the linchpinof the law?24He also notes thatcases of moral obligation call for the enforcementof a promise when the plaintiff has provided some service to the defendantfor which the plaintiff thereafteragrees
to pay.25
Now, I have no desire to dispute these expansions of contractualliability to cover a few marginalcases in which considerationis lacking. But
it is just perverse to insist that some form of reliance or returnbenefit
22. Id. at 719-720.
23. See PATRICK ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW 202-212 (1981)
(hereinaftercited as "PROMISES,MORALS & LAW")
24. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,?90.
25. See e.g., Webbv. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. App. 1935).
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should be necessary to enforce bargains if the parties prefer executory
enforcement.To be sure, there are lots of contract settings in which the
parties understandthat one side is allowed to "cancel"before the other
has begun work. For example, it is all right to cancel a plane reservation,
or a doctor's appointment, 24 hours in advance. However, Bramwell
would have never made the mistake of confusing a sensible default rule
with an inflexible legal command. In some financial markets,the ability
to make binding forwardcontractsis critical to the long term success of
the markets. If no one wants, nor needs, some mythical element of
"reliance"to make markets in these instruments,why insist otherwise?
Atiyah for one never offers any satisfactoryexplanationof why his poor
commercial instincts should receive so exalted a status. And it is not possible to provide one for him.
But it may be said, why worry aboutthese nice points of commercial
law: the real concern with backgroundsocial inequities does not point to
future markets. Instead, it points to minimum wage and maximum hour
legislation, to protective legislation that exempts trade unions from the
ordinaryrules of contractand tort,to rent controlon residentialreal estate,
to price controlsmore generallyand to fair tradein the internationalarena.
Here is not the place to examine any of these social initiativesin detail,but
can anyone think that the bureaucratictangles, the endless delays, the
pompousposturing,the political favoritism,and the stifling of competition
that results from this regime does better than Bramwell's traditional
injunction that allows people to enter into the bargains they choose
amongstthe many alternativesavailableto them?Judgedagainstthe shambles of these failed programs,Bramwellis indeed an intellectualgiant.
III. Quasi-contract
Furtherevidence of the ostensible fanaticism of Baron Bramwell
derives from his hostility to the law of quasi-contract,most notably in
connection with the consumptionof goods that are received by mistake.
He is chastised for his stubbornness on this point by Professor
Ramasastry,who writes that, in Boulton v. Jones26"Bramwellwas willing
to ignore completely the potentialinequity involved in one partyreceiving
a windfall at the expense of the seller due to the lack of any formal agreement."27
Once again, the charges against Bramwell are false, both insofar as
they describe Bramwell's position, and insofar as they imply that he was
the odd man out on questions of quasi-contractualliability. As to the first
point, the facts of Boulton v. Jones show not the dangersbut the strength
of Bramwell's position. The case arose when the plaintiff sold and delivered goods to the defendantundercircumstancesthat failed to give notice
that he had taken the assignment of the business from one Brocklehurst,
26. 157 Eng. Rep. 232 (Ex. 1857).
27. RAMASASTRY, mss. at 335.
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his former employer, against whom the defendant had a setoff from a
priortratisaction.The defendanttook and used those goods but refused to
pay for them, noting that his setoff was useless against the plaintiff, and
(it seems fair to add) against Brocklehursthimself, who had gone out of
business. A unanimouscourt (Pollock C.B., Martin,B., Channell,B., and
Bramwell, B.) all held that the plaintiff's action for the price failed
because the plaintiff concealed his true identity from the defendant.28
Bramwell gave, as an illustrationof his reasons,the general,and undoubted, propositionthat a contractfor the performanceof personal services is
not delegable to a thirdparty.In this case, the prejudicefrom the delegation arose because of the loss of the setoff, which Bramwell duly noted,
along with the arguablefraud on the plaintiffs part. So stated, the case
does not involve delivery of the goods "in error,"but something more
insidious. By no stretchof the imagination,does it representa case where
the defendantis acting in some irrationalor vengeful way.
Nor did Boulton receive a bad reception elsewhere. Thus, in Boston
Ice. Co. v. Potter,29the plaintiff delivered ice to the defendant without
disclosing his true identity.It seemed as though the plaintiff had once had
a contractwith the defendant,which had been terminatedbecause of the
defendant's dissatisfaction.The defendantentered into a second contract
with anothersupplier,the Citizens Ice Company,which was then acquired
by the plaintiff who did not give defendantnotice of the change in ownership. The ice delivered was of good quality, and the priced demanded
was only the market price. The case was, if anything, stronger for the
plaintiff than Boulton v. Jones, but the court nonetheless disallowed the
action, noting, without apparentconcern the following general proposition: "A partyhas a right to select and determinewith whom he will contract, and cannot have another person thrust upon him without his consent."30It promptlyinvoked by the same illustrationof the delegation of
the duty to paint a portraitthat Bramwell had used some 20 years before.
Boulton v. Jones was cited in the case, and the plaintiff sought to distinguish that decision as being more favorable to the defendantbecause of
the existence of the setoff on which Bramwell had placed some reliance.
But, the Courtquite sensibly brushedthe point aside, saying thatwhile the
existence of the setoff made Boulton easy for the plaintiff, the broader
right rested on the undoubtedpower of all persons to chose their trading
partners. Keener on Quasi Contracts31 and Cheshire & Fifoot on
28. Note that the setoff is referred to by all the judges in the Law Journal report, 27
L.J. Ex. 117, but in the Hurlstone & Norman version, only Bramwell is said to make the
argument.2 H & N. 564. See G.C. CHESHIRE& C.H.S. FIFOOT,THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 207, at note 3 (6th ed. 1964) (hereinaftercited as "CHESHIRE& FIFOOT"),
noting the incompletenessof Hurlstoneand Norman,and urgingreadersto consult the Law
Journalreport.
29. 123 Mass. 28 (1877).
30. Id. at 30.
31. WILLIAM KEENER, 2 A SELECTIONOF CASES ON THE LAW OF QUASICONTRACTS268-71 (1889).
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Contracts32reveal no dissatisfactionwith the decision.
The redoubtableAtiyahjoins the fray with a harshcriticism, treating
Boulton v. Jones as a bad decision that reflects Bramwell's unfortunate
views expressed in the FirstReportof the MercantileLaw Commission.
He [Bramwell] also disliked the whole law of quasi-contract,for he could not
understandhow a man could be forced to pay for a benefit which he had received
but which he had not agreed to pay for. While many people would accept the justice of this as a general rule, Bramwell carriedit so far that it is difficult to see
any room at all for quasi-contractualliabilities in his philosophy.
I ask, why should a man who buys goods pay for them? Either he
has undertakento do so, or he has not. If he has, make him liable to
the extent of his undertaking;to his last shilling and acres if he has
pledged them. But if he has not, if he has not undertakenat all, or if he
has limited liability, I do not only see no reason why he should be
called on to do that which he has not engaged to do, but I think it a
positive dishonesty to attemptto make him.33

Atiyah then notes that Bramwell gave expression to these views in
Boulton v. Jones, which he nowhereanalyzes.
Atiyah is just plain wrong. Initially, it is important to recall an
importantdistinctionbetween the two senses of quasi-contractor restitution. In one set of cases, restitutiondeals with the provisions to make payment for goods consumed by mistake when there is no trace of contract,
and by implicationno effort of one personto "thrust"himself upon another. The joint mistake of the two parties is a reason for affording some
remedy, be it returnof the goods or paymentof their marketvalue in the
event of consumption. But Bramwell's hostility does not extend to that
case, for as he says at the outset, his inquiryasks "why should a man who
buys goods pay for them?" It is impossible to infer from this that he
opposed quasi-contractin the classical cases of innocent mistake, which
are just not in issue here. We now are in the land of explicit agreement,
and once again Atiyah misstates Bramwell's position. Here, we do not
simply have cases where there is "a benefit for which he [the defendant]
has not agreed to pay for," which suggests that the matter was not
addressed.Rather,Bramwell's position is that where remedy is specific it
controls the scope of liability. In his picturesquelanguage, he notes that
the proposition applies where personal credit is extended ("to his last
shilling") where he has pledged real property ("and acres if he has
pledged them,") and neatly reversing field, that he should be protected
from suit ("if he has limited his liability,")a point of obvious concern to
Bramwell given his long-standinginterestin companylaw.
Does this view make Bramwell an extremist? Well let me join his
32. CHESHIRE& FITFOOT,supra note at 207 & 452.
33. See ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL at 376, quoting H.C. ParliamentaryPapers, xxvii
445, 471.
34. RichardA. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: ConsequentialDamages in the Law of
Contract, J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989), criticizing on just this point, L. L. Fuller and
William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L. J. 52
(1936).
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crowd, for I too believe thatcontractlanguagedominatesany abstracttheory of restitutionthat we as judges and law professorscan invent.34But, it
is a mistake to think thatthe law of restitutionshould be importedinto the
law of contractbecause of some divine symmetry.Rather,there are cases
in which the returnof the goods is appropriatebecause it has been specified by the parties, or because of the difficulty of making calculations
aboutexpectationdamages when these might otherwisebe prudent.35But,
there is no simple way to import the conceptions of restitutioninto contract, and Bramwell's views on this subject, which are typical of those of
nineteenthcenturyauthors,have been ably defended in a recent articleby
Professor Andrew Kull, a leading restitutionscholar of our own times.36
Against this background,it is hard to give much weight to the criticisms
of Bramwell's position.

IV. Tort
Bramwell's tough sense of principle is also evident from his decisions in the law of tort. The basic issues in tort can convenientlybe divided into two groups.The first of these addresseswhat must be shown about
the defendant's conduct in order to create a prima facie case of liability;
the second, what must be shown of plaintiffs conduct to eliminate that
liability in whole, or, after the advent of comparativenegligence, in part.
Bramwell addressedboth these issues at various stages in his careerand it
is useful to turnto them here.
A. ThePrima Facie Case
ProfessorAbrahamtakes Bramwell to task for his very poor opinion
in Blyth v. BirminghamWater Works,37on which I shall comment in a
moment. But I think thathe misreadsBramwell when he treatshim as the
devotee of a negligence system, which on many issues he was not. The
key decisions here are two: his famous opinion in Rylands v. Fletcher38
where he opts for a strict liability standardfor anyone who "pours or
sends" his own water into the mines or lands of another, and most
notably, his strongopinion in Powell v. Fall,39where he disagrees sharply
with the received wisdom of Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co.40 and
HammersmithR. Co. v. Brand.41Vaughan and Hammersmithboth took
35. See e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION25-27 (1981).
36. Andrew Kull, Restitutionas a Remedyfor Breach of Contract,68 SO. CALIF. L.
REV. (forthcoming1994).
37. 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex. 1856).
38. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865).
39. 5 Q.B. 597 (1880).
40. 157 Eng. Rep. 1351 (Ex. Ch. 1860).
41. L.R. 4 H. L. 171 (1869).
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the position that any railroadthat operated in compliance with statutory
standards should be relieved of liability for any harm that it caused
strangers.In doctrinalterms, the position was that compliance with statutory standards should be regarded as conclusive evidence of due care,
which is all that a defendantneeds to show in orderto escape liability in a
negligence based system.
Bramwell had no patience for this soothing reasoning.His ability to
take on the railroadsfor the benefit of whomever they injuredshows once
again that he showed no fear or favor to the rich and powerful whom he
treatedno better or worse than the poor and downtrodden.What is more,
he adopted a position that is clearly right as a matter of theory.
Theoretically,if legislation and adjudicationare sound, there is no allocative difference between a negligence and a strict liability standard.42But
Bramwell was one who realizedthat things were never perfect. He put the
argumentas follows:
TheLocomotiveActsarerelieduponas affordinga defence,butinsteadof helping the defendanttheyshewnot only thatan actionwouldhavebeenmaintainableat commonlaw,butalso thatthe rightto sue for an injuryis carefullypreserved.It is just andreasonablethatif a personuses a dangerousmachine,he
shouldpay for the damagewhichit occasions;if therewardwhichhe gainsfor
theuseof themachinewill notpayforthedamage,it is mischievous
to thepublic
and ought to be suppressed,for the loss ought not to be borne by the community

or theinjuredperson.If theuse of the machineis profitable,
theowneroughtto

pay compensationfor the damage.43

Clearly a strong threadlinks the Bramwell of Powell v. Fall to the
Bramwell of Manchester, Sheffield & LincolnshireRailway Companyv.
H. W. Brown. In both cases, Bramwell senses that the social question is
one that asks where that loss should be imposed and why. It is easy for
railroadsto trumpetthe general benefits that they provide, and thus divert
attentionfrom the question of whetherthe increasein benefitsjustifies the
parallel increase in cost. But why trust these pious declarations?The best
test if functional: forces the defendant to pay in order to continue. If it
cannot pay the damages, then there is good evidence to believe that its
pious protestationsare wrong. If it can, then there is good proof that its
declarationsare right. Of course, even damageawardsmay be insufficient
if railroads cause irreparableharm to life and property in the ordinary
course of their operations, which is why some statutorycommands are
appropriatefor their operation. But, it hardly follows that because this
horriblerisk exists, and these importantprecautionsare taken, that damages should not be awardedin cases where the precautionsthemselves fall
short. Statutorycompliance, therefore,is a necessarybut insufficient condition for sound operationin this strangersetting. Once it is recognized
that the clever railroad may well have induced the legislature to adopt
precautions that are less than optimal, then the case for strict liability
42. See John Prather Brown, Toward on Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1973).
43. Powell v. Fall, 5 Q.B. at 600-01.
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becomes still stronger.It forms a judicial barrieragainst the manipulation
of the legislature,one that lasts until the legislature-in Bramwell's case,
Parliament-gives unmistakableevidence of its own intention. Where is
the weakness in this position?
Bramwell's opinion in Rylands v. Fletcher44 is much to the same
effect. On his view of the facts, the defendant had poured and sent its
water into the plaintiffs mine, and that was the end of the case. In his
view, it hardly matteredwhether the action was done with ignorance or
with knowledge of the dangerousconsequences:"As a rule the knowledge
or ignorance of the damage done is immaterial."45In my view, Bramwell's pronouncement was correct on the facts of this case because
Rylandsitself did not reveal any contributorynegligence or other misconduct by the plaintiff that might make an allegation of intention(for which
knowledge would be powerful evidence) relevant by way of reply. The
odd point seems to be that Baron Martin'sinsistence on a negligence rule
came less from his disagreement about the proper rule for water "cast
upon the plaintiffs land."Rather,here Martinpreferredto stress that the
reservoirwas half full as well as half empty. He thus redescribedevents:
"What they [the defendants] did was this, they dug a reservoir in their
own land and put water in it, which, by undergroundopenings of which
they were ignorant,escaped into the plaintiffs land. I think this is a very
different thing from a direct casting of water upon the land," for which a
differentlegal rule-negligence-held.
The irony here is that Martintreats the suit as one for indirectharm
and hence applies the negligence rule. Judge Blackburn'sgenius was to
accept Martin's descriptionof the facts, and to flip the law to the "true
rule"
that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and

keepsthereanythinglikely to do mischiefif it escapes,mustkeep it in at his
peril,and,if he does not do so, is primafacie answerablefor all the damage
whichis thenaturalconsequence
of its escape.He canexcusehimselfby shewing thatthe escape was owing to the plaintiffs default;or perhapsthat the escape
was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort

exitshere,it is unnecessary
to inquirewhatexcusewouldbe sufficient.46

In essence, Blackburnapplies a strict liability rule to what would in
the earlier days of special pleading be an action on the case, normally
governed by negligence rules. The ultimateirony is that since some water
was at rest before the bottomof the reservoirburstand some was not, two
forces were involved, so that trespass and case are each appropriatebut
only for half the water.The case thus straddlesthe categories.
A unified strict liability theory for direct and indirect harms is, on
balance, preferable,but neither Bramwell nor Blackburnquite addressed
this possibility because neitherwas attentiveto the difference in physical
properties between solids and liquids. It would have behooved all the
44. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865).
45. Id. at 744.
46. Fletcher v. Rylands,L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279-80 (1866).

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 13:27:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1994

FORABRAMWELL
REVIVAL

263

judges to recognize that fluids could confoundthe once regnantcategories
of trespass and case as no hypotheticalcase about log in the road could
possibly do.47 The right response thereforewas for some court to say it
does not matter whether the water was poured into the mine or merely
broughtand collected there: either way, the defendantis responsible if it
enters the plaintiff's mine unless it can be showed that a third party
poured it there, a point on which I will focus in a moment. Bramwell thus
missed (as did Blackburn,J.) the opportunityto create a uniformbody of
tort law for harm caused to strangersin which both sides of the directness/indirectnessline would be governed by the strict liability principle
that Bramwell so elegantly defended 15 years later in Powell v. Fall. But
here, his sin is only that of omission. It hardlypoints to any deficiency is
his world view on strict liability in tort, for indeed such deficiencies are
hardto find.
ProfessorRamasastrydoes not take Bramwell to task for his opinion
in Rylands itself, but she does think that two of his later decisions retreat
from it. Carstairs v. Taylor48refused to apply the strict liability principle
of Rylands to the defendant-landlordfor harm caused when a rat gnawed
througha gutter that he had installed in a warehouse that he sharedwith
the plaintiff-tenant who occupied the lower floor. However, the two reasons Bramwell gave for the distinctionare no mere contrivance,but consistent with his basic view. First, the landlordand tenant were in privity
with each other and the gutterwas constructedfor their mutualbenefit. It
was thus wholly unlike the reservoirin Rylands,which was for the benefit
of the defendantalone. Bramwellsaid as much.
In Rylandsv. Fletcherthedefendant,
forhis ownpurposes,conductedthewater

to the place from which it got into the plaintiffs premises. Here the conducting
of the water was no more for the benefit of the defendantthan of the plaintiff. If

theyhadbeenadjacentowners,it wouldhavebeenforthebenefitof theadjacent

owner that the water from his roof was collected, and the case would have been
within the decision in Rylands v. Fletcher; but here the roof was the common
protection of both, and the collection of the water running from it was also for
theirjoint benefit.49

As in so many othercontexts, the usual rule when one partyundertakesan
action for the benefit of both, is to insist on a standardof ordinarycare.
Bramwell would have honored any lease provision draftedto deal with
this contingency whether it called for strict liability or full exoneration.
But his reading of the default provision is consistent with his earlier
views, not a deviationfrom them.50
His second explanation touches on the act of God exception men47. Reynoldsv. Clarke,92 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.B. 1726).
48. 6 L.R. 217 (Ex. 1871), criticized in Ramasastryat mss. 66-67, TAN 207-12.
49. Id. at 221-222.
50. It is possible to argue this case the other way on the strengthof the Nitroglycerine
Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 524 (1872). That case involved an unmarkedpackage containing
Nitroglycerinethatexploded when opened. Actions for wrongful deathwere denied for want
of proof of negligence, but an action for damage premises were allowed on the theory that
the covenants underthe lease were strict.
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tioned but not explored by Blackburn.It may seem odd to find that the
gnawing of rats counts, for its seems more like the act of a stranger.But in
principle there is no reason why it should not. The only question to be
asked is whether the landlord owed some special duty to the tenant in
virtue of the lease to preventthe damage or to repairthe gutterbefore the
flooding took place? On these mattersthe lease itself was silent, so that
the question again reduces to a search for negligence by lessor, of which
there was none. The materialsused were standardin the trade,and he conducted an inspection of the drains some four days before the rats gnawed
into them. The landlord'sposition is Carstairsis solid.
Nor did Bramwell deviate from his general strictliability position in
Nichols v. Marsland,51which involved waters stored in a complicatedset
of weirs and ornamentalpools. A storm of great force arose and wrested
the watersout of theirembankments,and the questionwas whetherthe act
of God defense, which was adumbratedby Judge Blackburnin Fletcher v.
Rylands, was applicablein this case. Bramwell held that it was, given the
severity of the storm.His languagedoes give clear hints of negligence:
In this case I understandthe jury to have found that all reasonablecare had been
taken by the defendant,thatthe bankswere fit for all events to be anticipated,and
the weirs broad enough; that the storm was of such violence as to be properly
called the act of God, or vis major. No doubt, as was said by Mr. McIntyre,a
shower is the act of God as much as a storm;so is an earthquakein this country;
yet every one understandsthat a storm, supernaturalin one sense, may properly,
like an earthquakein this country, be called the act of God, or vis major. No
doubt not the act of God or a vis majorin the sense that it was physically impossible to resist it, but in the sense that it was practically impossible to do so. Had
the banks been twice as strong,or if thatwould not do, ten times, and ten times as
high, and the weir ten times as wide, the mischief might not have happened.But
those are not practical conditions, they are such that to enforce them would
prevent the reasonable use of property in the way most beneficial to the
community.52

Bramwell thus far appearsto make the idea of an act of God strictly
correlativewith the notion of negligence. Set the standardof care as you
will, and the act of God occurs when naturalforces exceed it. And since
set them he must, Bramwellwill choose a level that is capable of practical
compliance. Yet, in the next paragraph,he veers, imperceptibly, back
towards strict liability. He reverts to his own characterization and
observes thatthe defendanthad done nothingwrong.
It is not the defendantwho let loose the water and sent it to destroy the bridges.
She did indeed store it, and store it in such quantitiesthat, if it was let loose, it
would do, as it did, mischief. But suppose a strangerlet it loose, would the defendant be liable? If so, then if a mischievous boy bored a hole in a cistern in any
London house, and the water did mischief to a neighbour, the occupier of the
house would be liable. Thatcannot be.53

The clear implication is that he treats the storm like the act of a
stranger,or the gnawing of the rats, and thus within the act of God excep51. 10 L.R. 255 (Ex. 1875).
52. Id. at 258-59.
53. Id. at 259.
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tion that Blackburnintroducedbut did not flesh out in Rylands.
Bramwell might have added a joint causation argumentas well, for
if the water that did the damage was both that which was stored, and that
which came down the watercourse from the storm itself, there are two
causes for the injury,such that the water not so stored was solely responsible. Note that two different sources of water were also at play in
Rylands, but with this critical difference: the defendant was responsible
both for the water at rest in the reservoir, and the water that was being
poured into it. Here, this defendantis not responsible for the water from
the storm. I prefer this mode of thinking to the one which Bramwell
adopted, for its does avoid his argumentsabout letting harm go uncompensated from reasonable uses beneficial to the community, and thus
avoids the implicit clash with Bramwell's later emphatic sentiments in
Powell v. Fall, a case thathas no act of God overtones. But the price to be
paid here is that it requiresone to separatethe water into two components,
as is done in other cases where huge floods overcome dams and levies.
The case is on any account a close one, and Bramwell's mistakes, if they
are mistakes, are those which he shareswith others.
Although its immediate circumstancesare quite different, a similar
analysis applies to Bramwell's importantdecision in Holmes v. Mather,54
decided the same term as Nichols.55That opinion is typically quoted for
its discussion of the relationshipbetween trespass and case, an opinion
which shows a decided bias against the strict liability regime that
Bramwell championed both in Fletcher v. Rylands and Powell v. Fall.
Thus Bramwell wrote:
As to the cases cited, most of them are really decisions on the form of action,
whethercase or trespass.The result of them is this, and it is intelligible enough: if
the act that does an injuryis an act of directforce vi et armis,trespassis the proper remedy (if there is any remedy) where the act is wrongful,either as being wilful or as being the result of negligence. Where the act is not wrongful for either
of these reasons, no action is maintainable,though trespass would be the proper
form of action if it were wrongful.56

In effect, Bramwell has said that trespassonly lies where the immediate act that caused the action was done negligently or wilfully, the
antithesisof his general strict liability position. What is odd is that on this
point, for which the case is most often cited, Bramwellmade no argument
and he ignored the English precedents that seem to cut in the opposite
direction.57
But his historical points are far less interestingthan his substantive
discussion, which reveals a rathermore nuancedunderstandingof the situation. The basic facts of the case were that the defendantwished to try
out a new team of horses on a public way, and sat beside the groom as the
54. 10 Ex. 261 (1875).
55. TrinityTerm, 38 Victoria.
56. 10 Ex. 261 at 268-69.
57. See e.g., Weaverv. Ward,80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616);Leamev. Bray, 102 Eng. Rep.
724 (K.B. 1803).
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groom guided the horses on the road. A dog suddenly came from the side
of the road, barkedloudly, and panicked the horses so that they bolted.
The groom told the owner to sit tight and did all thathe could to bring the
horses undercontrol. As the out-of-controlcarriageroundedthe cornerto
the right, the groom saw the plaintiff standingthereand sought to lead the
horses away from her, but they kept on in the original direction,running
her down, and causing serious injury.
I believe thatHolmes is a textbook case in which the standardprinciof
ples strict liability ought to apply given that the control of the wagon
was fully within the defendant's hands, from the initial decision to try a
new dual harnessto the last moments before the crash. Better thatthe loss
should be located on the defendantthanthe plaintiffshould have to decide
which, if any, of these actions undertakenby the defendantand his groom
were negligent. The case law, however, went quite the other way, for
Blackburn'sopinion in Fletcher v. Rylands explicitly ruled out the possibility of strict liability actions for persons standing on or near the highway, in a passage that was quoted to the bench by defendant'scounsel.58
On this point at least the precedentwas reasonablyclear in demandinga
negligence standard.
Yet with all this said, Bramwell is ambivalentabout the negligence/
strict liability debate and misses his own live and let live point that he
raised some years before in Bamfordv. Turnley.59Thus, he writes, if the
plaintiff can recover for the injury occasioned by the dog bark, then "I
really cannot see why she could not bring an action because a splash of
mud, in the ordinarycourse of driving, was thrownupon her dress or got
into her eye and so injuredit. ... For the convenience of mankindin carrying on the affairs of life, people as they go along the roads must expect,
or put up with, such mischief as reasonablecare on the partof others cannot avoid."60Yet the illustrationgiven, of the splash of mud,61is an illustration of the form of low-level interaction for which Bramwell's own
58. Id. at 263, quotingFletcher v. Rylands, 1 Ex. 265, 286 (1866).
59. See the discussion infra at mss 42-44.
60. 10 Ex. 261 at 267.
61. The language returns again in the American context, where it is also used to support
the case of negligence see Osborne v. Montgomery, 234 N.W. 372, 276 (Wis. 1931), per
Rosenberry, J.
The fundamentalidea of liability for wrongful acts is that upon a balancingof the social
interestsinvolved in each case, the law determinesthat underthe circumstancesof a particular case an actor should or should not become liable for the naturalconsequencesof his conduct. One driving a car in a thickly populateddistrict,on a rainy day, slowly and in the most
careful manner,may do injuryto the personof anotherby throwingmuddyor infected water
upon that person. Society does not hold the actor responsiblebecause the benefit of allowing
people to travel undersuch circumstancesso far outweighs the probableinjuryto bystanders
that such conduct is not disapproved.Circumstancesmay requirethe driverof a firetruckto
take his truck througha thickly populateddistrict at a high rate of speed, but if he exercises
that degree of care which such drivers ordinarilyexercise underthe same or similar circumstances, society, weighing the benefits againstthe probabilitiesof damage,in spite of the fact
that as a reasonablyprudentand intelligent man he should foresee that harmmay result,justifies the risk and holds him not liable.
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rule'is appropriate.
'live-and-let-live
But,we shouldbe farmorereluctant
in thiscase,wherethemagnitudeof
to findimplicitin-kindcompensation

rulethat
so low.Thelive-and-let-live
theinjuryis greatanditsfrequency

workswell for repeatedlow level interactions(wherefrequencyis high
and severitylow) shouldnot be carriedover to these once-in-a-lifetime

situations.
Holmesv. Matheris alsotrickybecauseit is notreallya caseabout

negligenceas such.Viewedclosely,it fits into the samepatternfoundin

noless-for atbottom
Holmesinthereports,
Nichols-thecasepreceding
it is reallya case of inevitableaccident.62Thus,the nicestpointin the
opinioncomes as BramwellchasesafterHerschell,Q.C., with his usual
relentlessenergy:
Here,he [Herschell]says,if thedriverhaddonenothing,thereis no reasonto
supposethis mischiefwouldhavehappenedto the woman;buthe did give the
in thedirectionof theplaintiff-he drovethemthere.
horsesa pull,orinclination,
to drivethemfurtherawayfromtheplaceby getting
It is truethathe endeavored
themto turnto theright,buthe didnotsucceedin goingthat....
WhatI taketo be thecaseis this:he didnotguidethehorsesupontheplaintiff;
buttheyranawaywithhim,
he guidedthemawayfromher,in anotherdirection;
uponher,in spiteof his effortto takethemawayfromwhereshe was. It is not
thecasewherea personhasto makea choiceof two evils, andsinglestheplaintiff out,anddrivesto thespotwheresheis standing.... I thinkthattheobservathatif Mr.
tionmadeby my BrotherPollockduringthe argumentis irresistible,
Herschell'scontentionis right,it wouldcome to this:if I am beingrunaway
with,andI sit quietandlet thehorsesrunwhethertheythinkfit, clearlyI amnot
do my
liable,becauseit is they,andnotI, whoguidethem;butif I unfortunately
bestto avoidinjuryto myselfandotherpersons,thenit maybe saidthatthisis
my actof guidingthemthatbringsthemto theplacewheretheaccidenthappens.
Surelythisis impossible.63

Ifthebaseline
conWhatis atstakehereis a neatincentive
argument.

dition is that the owner is not liable for the runawayhorses, then
Bramwell'sconclusionquicklyfollows. We do not want(as is so often
donetodaywithvaccinesthatrelieveillness)to imposeliabilityon persons
who improvesituationsfromwhattheywouldhaveotherwisebeen.Thus,
if Holmeshadinvolvedthecaseof a thirdpersonwhosoughtto controlthe
ragingteam,imposingliabilityon him wouldbe perversebecauseof the

If society(including
taxit imposesonactionsto rescueandassistanother.
thenit
all potentialvictims)arebetteroff withtherescuebeingattempted,
is foolhardyto discouragethe rescueby holdingthe rescuerliablefor the
harmsthatdo remainwithoutgiving him creditfor the harmsthatare
averted.Thereis an implicitdivergencebetweenthe socialbenefitsof the

thatthelegalsystem
actandtheprivatecoststo theactor,a divergence
shouldseekto avoid.Evenif thereis no compensation
awardedforheroic
acts thatavoidinjury,the implicitoffset shouldbe thatthe injureris not

62. For a hint of this, note that Bramwelldid refer in argumentto Mouse's Case, 66 Eng.
Rep. 1341 (K.B. 1609). The referenceoccurs at 10 Ex. at 267.
63. Id. at 267-68. There is no reference to Baron Pollock raising this point in oral argument in the reports,thoughBramwellhintedat it. Id. at 265.
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held liable for actions that ex ante reduce the costs of harm.64

But here, the defendantis not an interloperbut the owner of the animals. The weakness in Bramwell's argumentrests in his assumptionthat
there ought to be no liability for the runaway animals in the first place.
Yet in my view, a rule of vicariousliability that treatsowners as responsible for the wrongful acts of their animals should be applied, with an
action over against the owner of the dog, if he could be found, for inducing the horses to bolt. The thirdpartycausationdoes not excuse the defendant but gives an action over, at least underthis thoroughgoingversion of
strict liability.65Now with this baseline, the Bramwell argumentcollapses. There are no longer any perverse incentives from holding the owner
liable to the plaintiff,for the defendantis fully compensatedfor his efforts
(or those of his servant)by the reductionin the likelihood of injuryin the
first place. As that is so, it no longer pays the defendantto remain idle if
some injuryreductionsteps are available. He should take the precautions
to reducethe losses to his own pockets. The individualincentives are once
again in perfect alignment with the social ones if the inevitable accident
defense is rejectedand if the defendantis held liable for the harmcaused
by the bolting horses regardlessof the source of theirfright.
Once the case is seen in this light, therefore,it is not just a case of
plain old ordinaryaccident,but a far narrowercategory of inevitableaccident, involving harms that could not be avoided by any practicable
steps.66In addition, the closer look at both Nichols and Holmes reveals
the implicit patternin Bramwell's argumentthat links up strict liability
and casual intervention into one not quite tidy bundle. In those cases
where the harm is one that the defendantcauses without interventionor
assistance from some other act, Bramwell is preparedto impose strict liability: that is surely his view in both Fletcher v. Rylands and Powell v.
Fall. But where there are genuine acts of intervention-the storm in
Nichols and the runawayhorses in Holmes-Bramwell will offer excuses
that sound in negligence but in practice read much more narrowly.And
64. Just this mistake was made in the earlier Tithes Case, Y.B. Trin., 21 Hen. 7, f. 26., pl.
5 (1506). I discuss this problem at length in Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and

the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J. LAW & ECON. 553, 579-582. I
also discuss the question of the implicit set off for benefits conferred in torts cases in
Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 68 SO. CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
65. See Richard 1994 A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
174-177 (1973).

66. Stephen Gilles, InevitableAccident in Classical English TortLaw, 43 EMORY L. J.
575, 577 (1994):
The pre-nineteenthcentury test for determiningwhether an accident was inevitable was
typically described in terms such as "utterly without his fault," "did all that was in his
power,""unavoidablenecessity,"and the like. To escape liability, defendantswho had prima
facie caused harmhad to establish thatthey should not be viewed as responsiblefor the accident because some other cause had made it impossible, as a practicalmatter,to avoid injuring the plaintiff. Under this approach,the question was not whether the actor had behaved
unreasonably-whether they should have avoided the accident-but whetherthey could have
avoided it by greaterpracticalcare.
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this inevitable accident conception is a deviation from the most rigorous
form of strict liability, but surely one that is eminently defensible in theory, and acceptedin practice.
B. Plaintiff's Conduct
Contributorynegligence. The flip side of tort laws deals with the
issue of plaintiffs conduct, where the classical division is that between
contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The first of these
defenses refers to cases where the plaintiffs conduct was a joint cause of
his own injury. On that issue, Bramwell made relatively little distinctive
contribution,but he was insistent that plaintiffs were as much responsible
for the consequences of their own actions as defendants. It is therefore
worth commentingbriefly on a couple of his cases, which give some clue
as to the tenor of his mind.
Mangan v. Atterton67 is a brief case which contains some of
Bramwell's harshestrhetoric.The defendantwhitesmithleft exposed on a
public street (as he customarily did) "a machine for crushing oil-cake,
unfenced and without superintendence."The machine was operatedby a
handle on one side and had exposed crushing rollers on the other side.
The handle could have been, but was not secured by wires. The plaintiff
was a four-yearold boy, who came along the street under the care of his
seven-year old brotherand in the company of friends. The boy stuck his
hand in the cogs at his brother's direction while his brother turned the
wheel, crushing the plaintiffs hand. The trial judge directed the jury to
find that if it thought that "the machine was dangerous, and one that
should not have been left unguardedin the way of ignorantpeople, and
especially children, without, at all events, the handle being removed or
fastened up and the cogs thrown out of gear,"68then they could award
damages to the plaintiff.
On appeal, the 10 pound verdict for the plaintiff was reversed.
Martin, B., held that the defendant's act was not the proximatecause of
the harm "becausethe accident was directly caused by the act of the boy
himself." Bramwell, B., concurred,not only for that reason but for another starkerone as well.
The defendantis no more liable thaniVhe had exposed goods colouredwith poisonous paint, and the child had sucked them. It may seem a harshway of putting
it, but suppose this machine had been of a very delicate construction,and had
been injured by the child's fingers, would not the child, in spite of his tender
years, have been liable to an action as a tortfeasor?That shews that it is impossible to hold the defendantliable.68A

To this outburst,Brian Simpson responded with evident exasperation-"Sir George Bramwell was plainly not a plaintiff's man,"69so
67. L.R. 1 Ex. 239, 240 (1866).
68. Id. at 239.
68A. Id. at 240.
69. A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liabilityfor BurstingReservoirs: The Historical Contextof
Rylandv. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 248 (1984).
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much so that Simpson questionedwhetherBramwell's dissent in Fletcher
v. Rylands(decidedjust the year before) might itself be taken as the "perhaps surprising,"given that the incautiousmining of the plaintiffcould be
regardedas the cause of his own harm. But, Simpson's view ignores the
strong proprietary elements in Bramwell's thinking. In Fletcher v.
Rylands, the defendant was in Bramwell's view a trespasserfor having
poured and set the water into the plaintiffs land, while the plaintiff was
undernot duty to take any steps to protectthat land from being flooded by
the foreign water of another(so long as he was preparedto take the risk
that naturalflooding would destroy his own mines). Mangan involved a
machine that was let to standon public property,where the defendanthad
as much right to be as the plaintiff. The force that impelled the damage
was, moreover, no action of the defendantbut that of the plaintiffs own
brotherwho, if anyone, was the trespasserin this unfortunatesituation,
even if he had intended no harm to his little brother.The causation element is one step removed. The only way to salvage this case for the plaintiff is to appeal to some doctrine of attractivenuisance, given the hidden
danger lurking in the machine. There is much American authority for
invoking a doctrine of that sort (most notably with railway turntables,70
but under circumstancesthat seem somewhat less favorable to the plaintiff, given that this crushingdevice was one thatchildrendid not habitually play with.) Yet even here, Bramwellmay not have been swayed even if
there had been habitual use because of his categorical reluctance to
impose affirmative duties to protect strangers,even children, from their
own mischief. But is he that wrong?The question still remains,if the parents entrustthe care of a four-yearold to a seven-year old, why should a
strugglingwhitesmithbe subjectto liability for that decision. Even today,
many attractivenuisance cases do not make it to the jury,71and the regnantRestatementprovisioncarefullycircumsizesthis head of liability.72
The ostensible harshnessin the decision does not, I suspect, derive
from the result in a case that would (I think)be left to a jury today, but in
Bramwell's choice of language. For him, liability was always a two-way
street.That conduct which was sufficient to create in a partyas defendant
was sufficient (in a world where contributorynegligence was a complete
defense) to block recovery for a plaintiff. The rival vision of a two-tier
system of negligence, in which the level of care expected of plaintiff is
lower than that expected by defendant,was not partof Bramwell's world
view.73 And why should a wrongdoer be able to profit from his own
wrong? So, the best way Bramwell could make his point is to show that
70. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1873).
71. See e.g., Hollnad v. Baltimore& Ohio R.R., 431 A.2d (D.C. App. 1981).
72. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS, ?339.
73. For evidence that such a standarddid have support,though in contexts removed from
Mangan, see Gary Schwartz, TortLaw and the Economy in NineteenthCenturyAmerica:A
Reinterpretation,90 YALE 1717 (1981); for the explicit defense of the two-tier system, see
Fleming James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Case, 16 MO. L. REV.
1(1951).
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the plaintiff as trespasserwould have to be responsible for any damage
that he caused the machine by his meddling. The irony is that Bramwell
does have a strong point, for a single unified standardsurely is easier to
administerthan a dual standardthat insists on some difference in the levels of care but is never quite able to instructa jury exactly what they are.
My own instincts are that Bramwell (and Martin) were probably wrong
here, and that the modest relaxation from this principle is the case of
infant trespassersproves more stable in practice than it does attractivein
theory. I think that the case is far closer than many others suspect and that
the success of the relaxationin liability stems not from the distance that
the law has moved, but from the closeness that modem doctrinesretainto
the uncompromisingBramwellposition.
The second of the Bramwell contributorynegligence opinions finds
him on far stronger ground. Stubley v. The London & North Western
Railway Co.,74involved a wrongfuldeathaction for damagesfor a woman
killed when she venturedon a train track at a crossing guardedby gates
and markedby caution boards.She had made the common mistakeof seeing one train go by, only to assume that both tracks were clear. A man
from the other side of the trackhad called out to her, but she was somewhat deaf, and did not hearhis last second warnings,and she never looked
up to see the onrushingtrain.The charge in the case was that the railroad
did not take sufficient precautionto keep ordinarypeople off the trackor
to warn them of oncoming trains.Bramwell did not deny that this was a
negligence case-a conclusion that does not lead him into inconsistency
with his subsequentdecision in Powell v. Fall, for here the decedent was
not a bystanderoff the road, but a trespasseron the line. But his individualism then came through.No guardcould keep her from crossing the track
if she so chose, and none should be requiredto warnher of what was evident to the senses. So Bramwell, with his usual energy dismissed the suggestion thata warningbe given by casting the blame on the decedent:
Warnthem of what?Thatwhen a carriageon your own side of the road is passed,
you will often find on the other side of the road a carriagewhich has not passed.
A policeman then is to be placed there to tell them, not what they do not know,
but what from carelessness or heedlessness they forget at a moment when it
ought to be remembered.If such a precautionis necessary here, it must also be
used elsewhere: and the argumentwould shew that on every road, every canal,
every railway in the kingdom, means must be taken to warn people against the
consequencesof their own folly.

Once again the language is blunt,but here it seems fully appropriate:
the cost of precautionsis surely cheaperwith the plaintiff, and, if hardof
hearing, all the more reason she should keep a ready lookout. Bramwell
was right to assume that the rest of the world could not alter its established patterns of business to protect her from her own neglect. So the
case is not really one of contributorynegligence, ratherit is one of alternative negligence: the plaintiff seeks to recover when she has been heedless and the railroadhas taken all appropriateprecautions.Unless plain74. L.R. 1 Ex. 13 (1865).
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tiffs are always to win as a matterof course, decisions like Stubleyhave to
come out as they do. Today, we could use a bit more of a philosophythat
holds all individuals,be they plaintiffs or defendants,responsible for the
consequences of their actions.
Assumptionof risk. For our purposes,however, the critical issue in
Bramwell's judicial philosophy concerns the scope and authorityof the
defense of assumption of risk. While it is sometimes easy to forget the
point, the question of employer's liability, as it was then known, was as
important to the general politics of the nineteenth century as, say, the
scope and applicationof the civil rights law are today. In both cases, the
disputedclaim is whetherindividualpartiescan set the termsof theirrelationships by contract, or whether they are bound to all the states who
determinewith whom they should deal and on what terms. For the nineteenth century jurist, an antidiscriminationstatute runs into the teeth of
the dictum in Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, concerningthe right of a party "to
select and determine"whom he will contractwith, which was treatedas a
self-evident truth.75But the principle of liberty of contract did receive a
powerful challenge in industrial accident cases, where the employer's
position was that any assumptionof risk by the individualworker should
barthe cause of action-at least if the contractso requiredit.
The attack on the principle of assumptionof risk was thereforenot
some detail on joint causation, as was the case with contributorynegligence, but on the vexed boundarybetween tort and contractover which
ceaseless battles were, and are, raised. The early decisions on the fellow
servantor common employmentrule made it appearas thoughthe worker
had, at least as against the employer, assumed the risk of injury from a
coworker.76That theory was one of the issues at stake in the passage of
the Employer's Liability Act of 1880,77 which repealed the common
employment defense, but which nonetheless left some scope for the
assumptionof risk defense. First, there was the question of whether the
parties could contractout of the employer's liability, which was allowed
in Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley on conventional freedom of contract
grounds.78The second form of the defense did not depend on an express
agreementbut on consent implied from the circumstances,which preoccupied the English Courtof Appeals throughoutthe 1880s.79The question
constantly was put in the form of the relationshipbetween knowledge of
the risk, which did not provide a defense to liability, and assumptionof
75. 123 Mass. 28, 30 (1877).
76. The English precedent is Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837). The
famous American precedent, which exerted its influence in England as well as Farwell v.
Boston & WorcesterR.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842), anotherShaw opinion. I comment at
length on these early developments in Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and
EconomicStructureof the Workers'CompensationLaw, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982).
77. 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42 (1880).
78. Q.B.E. 357 (1882).
79. See e.g., Yarmouthv. France, 19 Q.B.D. 647 (1887); Thomas v. Quartermaine,18
Q.B.D. 685 (1887).
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risk, which did. The decisions left the question in some degree of doubt
until the matterreached the House of Lords in Smith v. Baker,80a decision that saw Bramwell in lone dissent from his compatriots.
The case involved a workerwho was injuredwhen a stone that was
being slung over him fell from its sling and hit the plaintiffs head. The
plaintiff admittedthathe had received a generalwarningfrom his supervisor to be aware of stones that were being slung but said that he had
received no warning about the particular stone that had hit him, even
thoughother workers(who also thoughtthe practicedangerous)got out of
the way. It was uncertainbased upon the facts whetherthe droppingof the
stone was negligent, but the case went off on the issue of whetherthe risk
was assumedon these facts for an injurythat might have been negligently
caused. The majorityof the House of Lords held that he "didnot consent
at all. His attentionwas fixed upon a drill, and while, therefore,he was
unable to take precautionshimself, a stone was negligently slung over his
head without due precautionsagainst it being permittedto fall."81Hence
full liability.
Bramwell may have voted alone in the House of Lords, but he did
agree with the three Lord Justices of the Court of Appeal (Coleridge,
Lindsey, and Lopes, all strongjudges) who thoughtthatthe assumptionof
risk defense held even if the negligence allegationscould have been made
out.82In any event, the substantivedisputebetween Bramwelland his colleagues was at one level very small, for Bramwell was (rightly in my
view) preparedto infer from the conversationbetween the ganger and the
workmenthat they had the sole responsibililtyto take care of themselves,
and that the supervisorwould not be in a position to give them any individualizedwarning.To Bramwell,it did not matterthat the workerdid not
have specific knowledge of this particularthreat.It was enough that the
worker had complete knowledge of the practice and of the danger that it
posed. It was a case in which consent was inferredconclusively from continuationof the work with knowledge of the risk, the sort of decision that
resultedin an assumptionof risk defense in this countryin some jurisdictions at thattime.83
Bramwell did not get into hot water because of the facts of the case
or his disputedview of them. Rather,he has been frequentlycriticized for
using the language of the bargainto explain why the plaintiff should be
denied recovery.
It is a rule of good sense that if a man voluntarilyundertakesa risk for a reward
which is adequateto induce him, he shall not, if he suffers from the risk, have a
compensationfor which he did not stipulate. He can, if he chooses, say "I will
undertakethe risk for so much, and if hurt, you must give me so much more or,
80. [1891] A.C. 325.
81. Id. at 336, per Lord Halsbury,L.C.
82. Id. at 329.
83. See e.g., Titusv. Bradford,B. & K.R. Co., 20 A.517 (Pa. 1890). I discuss and defend
this and similar cases in RichardA. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theoryand
History of Customin the Law of Tort,21 J. LEGALSTUD. 1 (1992).
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anequivalent
forthehurt."Butdropthemaxim.Treatit as a questionof bargain.
Theplaintiffherethoughtthepayworththerisk,anddid notbargainfor a comthe work,withits risks,for his wages
pensationif hurt:in effecthe undertook
andno more.He saysso. Supposehe hadsaid,"IfI amto runthisrisk,youmust
give me 6s. a dayandnot5s.,"andthemasteragreed,wouldhe in reasonhavea
claimif he gothurt?Clearlynot.Whatdifferenceis thereif themastersays,"No;
I would only give the 5s."? None. I am ashamedto argue it.84

Atiyah, for one, pounces on the passage for the sin of circularity:
"WhatBramwell failed to perceive here as in numerousother instances,
was that he was always assuming what he set out to prove"85- namely
that the workman had assumed the risk. But it was, in Atiyah's view,
equally consistent with the facts that for the wage stated, the workerhad
bargainedfor the right to compensationin the event of injury. Yet, here
again, Atiyah misses several points. First, no one in the House of Lords
arguedthatthe termsof the bargainwent in the opposite direction;instead
they insisted on a knowledge of the specificity of the risk as a precondition for the assumptionof risk defense, without ever saying why it was
relevant. Neither did they, nor Atiyah, give any affirmativereasons as to
why or how Atiyah's renditionof the bargainmight have comportedwith
the facts of the case. Yet oddly enough, Bramwell did undertakethat task
even before the quoted passage, stressingthe importanceof the foreman's
earlier warning that no specific warning would be given. Moreover, the
"He says so," in the quoted passage is a way of saying that the risk was
express. In addition,if one were to take the more theoreticaltack of asking who is the cheapercost avoider, it could well be the employee, given
the warnings that he received but did not act on. So, Bramwell is surely
on respectablegroundthatthe bargainwas just as he said it was.
Atiyah, however, does not give up the hunt but goes on to say that
Bramwell did not realize thatthe questionof circularityplagues any effort
to explain the common sense conclusion that passengers of the railroad
did not assume the risk of employee negligence in any suit against the
employer, while the fellow servant did.86It may well be that Bramwell
did not provide the argument, but it should not be supposed that none
could be providedto fill the gap. The simple explanationrelatesto the relative capacity for avoidance. Workersare chosen for their skills and their
diligence, and the expectation is that they will take steps for their own
safety, just as they take steps for the safety of their passengers. But passengers come in all ages, sizes, and capacities, and it is clear that their
only duty is to follow the instructionsthat they receive, namely, to stay
out of the way. For them, specific acts of negligence have to be proved.
The difference in outcome rests on the difference in capacity for loss
84. [1891] A.C. at 344.
85. See ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL at 377. ProfessorRamasastrymakes a similarpoint
not only with respect to his decision in Smithv. Baker, but also with his more generalopposition to the Employer's Liability Act of 1880, where he stood largely alone in Parliament.
GALLEYSAT 46-47.
86. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL at 378, criticizing Bramwell's testimony to a House of
Commons Select Committeeon Employers'Liabilityin 1876.
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avoidance, which is capturedin a rough and ready way by the mannerin
which passengersand employees are selected. Whateverthe shifts in rules
on employees, the default rules on passengers of common carriershave
remainedlargely unchangedas we move from railroadsto jet planes.
These debates between Bramwell and his critics are so energetic
because of the underlyingrealizationthat all players are involved in a bigger game. Let this or that default question be decided one way, and in a
world of free contractthe terms could be made explicit in the otherif people find them inefficient or unwise. Yet, it was not the choice of default
rules, but the more basic principle of freedom of contractthat was under
attack in England in the 1890s. Freedom of contractmanaged,barely, to
survive the Employer's Liability Act of 1880,87but it most certainly did
not survive the Workmen'sCompensationAct of 1897,88which, as Dicey
noted, did away with any freedom of contractdefense unless the private
agreement "secures to the workmen benefits at least as great as those
which they would derive from the CompensationActs; and this arrangement must be sanctionedby a State official."89Dicey was quick to understandthe implications,which he statedin the next sentence. "This legislation bears all the markedcharacteristicsof collectivism."90And the real
battle was whetherthis approachwas a good thing.
Bramwell of course railed against such legislative interventionswith
all the power that he could summon, and for good reason. The state
should let the parties contractas they will. Bramwell's only mistake was
to fail to see the descriptive point that there is no necessary connection
between any contractsthat the partiesmight choose to make and the common law rules of negligence and assumptionof risk that he defended in
Smith v. Baker. In fact, it was common in England at his time to adopt a
voluntaryarrangementthat foreshadowedthe coverage rules of the workmen's compensationacts. Here is not the place to explain why the compensation arrangementis likely to be mutuallybeneficial in the dangerous
employments(such as mines and railroads)in which it was adopted.91
V. Collective Action Problems
The common law rules of contract,restitution,and tort do not directly respond to the collective action problems that prove so intractableto
the law. To set the stage for this discussion, it should be sufficient to say
that the prisoner's dilemma game is so well known today that it hardly
87. 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42 (1880).
88. 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37 (1897).
89. A.V. LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC
OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTHCENTURY (1st ed. 1905) (hereinaftercited as "DICEY,LAW AND OPINIONS").The Section of the Act is ?3. This need
for state approvalmade it more difficult to reachprivateagreements.
90. See DICEY, LAW AND OPINION282.
91. For my effort, Epstein,Historical Origins, supra note at 76.
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needs repetition.Each of two actors would be better off to cooperatewith
the other.Nonetheless, the temptationfor privategain leads both to defect
from the cooperativesolution, such thateach is left worse off than before.
Indeed one justification for governmentalcompulsion is to prevent that
defection, even where the individual actors do not use force or fraud to
seek to take advantageof the incompetenceof the other. The justification
for governmentcoercion is that it benefits both sides to the transactionin
circumstancesin which consent is not available to organize their activities. The basic thrustof social contracttheory (where social contractsare
not ordinarycontracts)rests on just this insight. All persons are betteroff
with the mutualrenunciationof the use of force, which they are powerless
to bring about by any series of bilateralcontracts,however skillfully constructed.
It is not, however, only in a state of naturethat coordinationproblems arise. They also arise in civil society. Nuisance law, which polices
the boundaries between landowners, often has to respond to just these
coordination problems, and in a routine case of this sort, Bramwell, in
what may have been his finest moment, statedclearly the propositionthat
anticipates the next century's welfare economics. Thus, he writes in
Bamfordv. Turnley.92
The instancesput duringthe argument,of burningweeds, emptyingcess-pools,
making noises during repairs, and other instances which would be nuisances if
done wantonly or maliciously, nevertheless may be lawfully done. It cannot be
said that such acts are not nuisances, because, by the hypothesis, they are; and it
cannot be doubtedthat,if a person maliciously and withoutcause made close to a
dwelling-house the same offensive smells as may be made in emptying a
cesspool, an action would lie. Nor can these cases be got rid of as extreme cases,
because such cases properlytest a principle.Nor can it be said that the jury settle
such questionsby finding thereis no nuisance,thoughthereis.... Theremust be,
then, some principleon which such cases must be excepted. It seems to me that
that principlemay be deduced from the characterof these cases, and is this, viz.,
thatthose acts necessaryfor the common and ordinaryuse and occupationof land
and houses may be done, if conveniently done, without submittingthose who do
them to an action . . There is an obvious necessity for such a principleas I have
mentioned. It is as much for the advantageof one owner as of another;for the
very nuisancethe one complains of, as the result of the ordinaryuse of his neighbour's land, he himself will create in the ordinaryuse of his own, and the reciprocal nuisancesare of a comparativelytrifling character.The convenience of such a
rule may be indicatedby calling it a rule of give and take, live and let live....
But it is said that, temporaryor permanent,it is lawful because it is for the
public benefit. Now, in the first place, that law to my mind is a bad one which,
for the public benefit, inflicts loss on an individual without compensation.But

92. 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex. 1862): Even Patrick Atiyah quotes this passage at
length and accords it faint praise: "On this point Bramwell's economics seems to have been
somewhat sounder,and indeed, not unsophisticated,for he was takinginto accountexternalities. It is difficult to understandwhy he never saw the need to do this when discussing freedom of contract."See ATIYAH at 380. But as should be evident from the text, Bramwell's
economics is light-years ahead of Atiyah's. As to the last point, if there were reciprocal
gains from nonenforcementof contracts,then the result should apply, as indeed it does, see
infra at 279-281.
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further,with great respect, I think this considerationis misappliedin this and in
many other cases. The public consists of all the individuals of it, and a thing is
only for the public benefit when it is productiveof good to those individualson
the balance of loss and gain to all. So that if all the loss and all the gain were
borne and received by one individual, he on the whole would be the gainer. But
whenever this is the case,-whenever a thing is for the public benefit, properly
understood,-the loss to the individualsof the public who lose will bear compensation out of the gains of those who gain. It is for the public benefit there should
be railways, but it would not be unless the gain of having the railway was sufficient to compensate the loss occasioned by the use of the land requiredfor its
site; and accordinglyno one thinks it would be right to take an individual's land
without compensationto make a railway.

Every syllable of this opinion occupies just the rightplace. Bramwell
understandsthe basic prohibitionagainst invasion of the propertyof others-the very proposition that he was to defend just two years later in
Rylands.Bramwell thus avoids the Coaseantrapof being unableto assign
causationin individualcases, for he admits the existence of a nuisance in
the case.93Yet, by the same token, he understandswhy it makes no sense
to provide any legal remedy in those cases of "live and let live" where
small violations of right could work to the long term disadvantageof all
parties, in circumstanceswhere it is too costly for them to escape from
their initial dilemmas by contact. So, he relaxes the basic rule of liability,
not by pretendingthatthere was no physical invasion, but by showing that
the relaxation works for the mutual benefit of both sides. Note that this
principledoes not allow the violation of individualrights for the public at
large; rather,it calls for the infringementof everyone's rights for the benefit of everyone, given the reciprocalnatureof the benefits so conferred.
To make good this insight, Bramwell then weaves togethertwo fundamentalprinciplesof welfare economics. First, he cuts throughthe usual
cant about the public interest and notes that it is not separate from the
welfare of all its citizens-including those who are subjectto onerousregulations. "The public consists of all the individualsof it" as succinct and
accuratestatementof the principle of methodologicalindividualism,as it
has come to be called, as one could hope to see. There is no longer any
mythical or abstractpublic that benefits when individualsand firms sacrifice their entitlements to onerous regulations. There are only some who
benefit and some who lose. How then do we decide whether to go forward?Again Bramwell does not miss a beat: "a thing is only for the public benefit when it is productiveof good to those individuals on the balance of loss and gain to all. So that if all the loss and all the gain were
borne and received by one individual,he on the whole would be the gainer." So, here is the standardtest of economic efficiency accuratelystated
and fairly applied a half centurybefore it made its way into standardeconomic theory. This is not the unthinkingvoice of laissez faire, but a careful analystwho has hit upon a rule for rankingalternativesocial states.
So how does one use this insight? Again, Bramwell sees the connection between the ordinarytort law and the general theory of just compen93. See RonaldH. Coase, TheProblemof Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
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sation before those comparisons were fully understood in this country.
"But whenever this is the case,-whenever a thing is for the public benefit, properly understood,-the loss to the individuals of the public who
lose will bear compensationout of the gains of those who gain."The parallel to his vision in Powell v. Fall is complete, and how much better the
social order would be if the legislation evaluated under our own takings
clause were forced to conform with Bramwell's dictates. No longer is it
enough to justify regulationsolely by saying it serves the public interest,
when such may not be the case. Better it is that when propertyrights are
taken (even the right to exclude the fumes of others) compensation be
supplied,be it in cash or kind. I must say that over the years this passage
has had an enormous influence on my own thinking,94for it makes clear
the linkage between the private tort law and the constitutionalprinciples
of property, public use, and just compensation. No one could charge
Bramwell with an unthinkingdevotion to the principles of laissez faire,
for he, better than anyone else, has explained why and how the just compensation principle becomes part of a legal system that can no longer
make do exclusively with the principles of private propertyand freedom
of contract. The new element of forced exchanges, of takings with just
compensation,has to be injectedinto the overall system.
It is here, however, that one can quarrel with some of the other
Bramwell opinions that give both Abrahamand Ramasastrysome pause.
The opinions which draw the greatest criticisms are those which contain
the potential for applying Bramwell's more general theoremof costs and
benefits developed in Bamfordv. Turnley.It is worthwhileto mentionjust
a few of them here.
One of his earliest tort decisions, Blyth v. BirminghamWaterWorks
Co.95is best known, not for Bramwell's contribution,but for the canonical definition of negligence offered by Baron Alderson. "Negligence is
the omission to do somethingwhich a reasonableman, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or doing somethingwhich a prudentand reasonableman would
not do."96
That sentiment seems harmless enough in its generality,but it does
contain an implication that would set off warning bells in someone with
Bramwell's strong libertarianbent. It equates commission with omission
and thus tends to undo the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance that animatesso much of the common law. In the context Alderson
utteredit, the point made good sense. The defendantwas no ordinaryindividual, but a waterworkscompany whose charterimposed on it a wide
range of affirmativeobligations. It is one of the oddities of the case that
94. See for example, Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its
Utilitarian Constraints,8 J. LEG. STUD. 49, 82-90 (1979), and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,

TAKINGS:
PRIVATE
PROPERTY
ANDTHEPOWEROFEMINENT
DOMAIN230-238
(1985).
95. 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex. 1856).
96. Id. at 1049.
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both Alderson and Bramwell sought to measure the defendant's duty by
the type of system that was first installed, therebyignoring the caking of
ice on the hydrantwhich made it evident to all that something was amiss
during that severe winter. Here, it is not hard to conclude that the defendant's duty covered the maintenance of the system and that in turn
required inspections and repairs as necessary. Defendant in fact made
those repairsafterthe accidentin question.
Bramwell, of course, would be very uneasy about these duties, and
in his concurringopinion took the position that the "defendantswere not
boundto keep the plugs clear. It appearsto me thatthe plaintiffwas under
quite as much obligation to remove the ice and snow which had accumulated, as the defendants."That statementwould be true if there were an
act of God on neutral turf that either could prevent and neither had
caused. But here, I have no doubt that the legal position for waterworks
was no differentthan that which appliedin Chicago this past winter when
the pipes leading to the Epstein household froze (twice, thank you). We
were forbiddenby the City to touch the system ourselves, for fear that it
would be impossible to trace any damagethat we might cause to the operation as a whole by any misguidedrepairs.The City insisted on the exclusive right to deal with the system, and our only obligation was to notify
the City of a break in order to get them to schedule the repairs.Dealing
with public utilities makes the misfeasance/nonfeasancecalculus irrelevant, and Bramwell should be faulted for not seeing the implications of
his own later formulationin Bamfordv. Turnley.The coordinationproblem between various individuals who might (but need not) be injuredby
the possible leakage from the plug is overcome by having the affirmative
duty placed on the WaterWorks, which is quite happy to assume it in any
event as partof its ordinarybusiness. Alderson was thereforeright in this
context to be indifferentto the omission/commissiondistinction,but both
men would have done a far betterjob generally if they had geared their
decision to the distinct,institutionalstatusof the WaterWorks.
Bramwell did somewhatbetter,but far from perfectly, on the collective action problemin Atkinsonv. Denby97where the plaintiff, who owed
the defendantsome ?319, had paid defendant?50, and issued a promissory note for another?108 in order to get the defendantto sign a composition agreementwhich said that each creditoragreed to release the plaintiff-debtorfrom his obligations for 5s. on the pound, or for 25 percentof
liability. The question was whether the plaintiff could sue the defendant
for the recovery of the ?50 so paid, and by implication not pay the
remaining?108 on the debt. Bramwell sided with two of his colleagues to
hold that the ?50 paid was recoverable. Professor Ramasastry rightly
points to some isolated language of Bramwell's opinion to show that he
had some concern with the dangers of overreachingin a contractualsetting-which could be taken to show that he really did worry about
97. 158 Eng. Rep. 321 (Ex. 1861).
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exploitation and unfairnessin contractit.98But a closer look at the opinion shows thatBramwell sufferedfrom no such weakness of temperament
or intellect. Thus, the full sentence reads: "Here,though in one sense the
paymentwas voluntaryand the agreementillegal, it was a paymentunder
coercion, and the parties were not in pari delicto because there was an
oppressorand an oppressed."99The concernwith oppressorand oppressed
was solely within the context of the law of illegal contracts,which is why
the referencewas to plaintiff not being in pari delicto with the defendant.
It was said to furnisha reason why the money should be recoveredafterit
had been paid off.
To understand the full case, it is important to remember-as
Bramwell noted, but BaronPollock-stressed thatthe transactionin question was to be condemnedlargely as a fraudon the other creditors.These
creditorshad settled for 25 percentof their debts while the defendant,who
had entered into a binding agreementwith them, sought to get 50 percent
of his debt paid outside the settlement, 25 percent under the settlement,
and to conceal the full arrangementfrom his contractingpartners.In this
set of circumstances,it is difficult to see who is oppressing whom: after
all, the defendantagreed to release one-quarterof his claim, and there is
no question that if the composition had just been between these two parties, without the master agreementbetween the debtor and all his creditors, Bramwell and his colleagues would have happily enforced it as a
routinecompromiseof a claim. It is thereforethe collective action aspects
of the situationthatrenderthis preference,as we should not call it, so suspect. But here, the creditorswere onto the risk and so covenantedamong
themselves to accept 5s. on the pound. The real victims thereforeare neither the plaintiff nor the defendant:they are the other creditorswho have
lost assets thatwere concealed form them.
Ideally, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant should keep the
money that was concealed from view. It would be nice to pay it over to
the creditors generally, but they did not sue here. Perhapsit was understood that once the plaintiff gained the returnof the money, it would be
turnedover to these somewhat astonished creditors,but that point is not
made fully clear in the opinion. The closest we get is Pollock's observation, which speaks to the evil of the concealment,without quite giving the
creditors' the loot: "It is a gross fraud on the other creditors, and if we
were to hold thatthe money could not be recoveredback, the consequence
would be that creditorswould refuse to enter into arrangements,each sus-

98. She writes;
The language and natureof his early opinion seem to be a vast departurefrom the traditional
portrayalof Bramwell as a judge who refuses to interferewith the terms of private agreements. I have not been able to locate a specific reason for his judgment,but it appearsquite
anomalous with regard to its language and acknowledgment of the "oppressor"and "the
oppressed."
RAMASASTRY, at 334.
99. 158 Eng. Rep. at 325.
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pecting that the other was endeavoringto obtain an unfair advantage."l00
But, he does not quite say that the other creditorsshould get the money as
assets concealed from them fraudulentlyin negotiation. The question of
oppression was bound up with the third party fraud, on which Pollock
spoke more extensively than Bramwell. Yet no matterhow one reads it,
Atkinsonaffords no reason to think that Bramwell had retreatedfrom his
steadfast views that in ordinarycommercial arrangementsthe terms of a
contractshould be enforced as written.
The final opinion in which Bramwell discussed, albeit it only
obliquely, collective action problems is Ibottson v. Peat,101 a case of
which Abrahamis sharply critical.102The discussion of water rights in
that case is cryptic and highly individualistic.Bramwell notes, quite simply, that the case of Chasemorev. Richards,103shows that "if a man has
the misfortune to lose his spring by his neighbour's digging a well, he
must dig his own well deeper."104The decision reflects the view that the
only wrong that one owner of propertycan commit against another is a
physical invasion of the premises. This position is surely incomplete in
the sense thatdigging the well by one personhas powerful externalconsequences on the welfare of another, so that the fair question to ask of
Bramwell, and of the House of Lords, is why that set of consequences
should be ignored. The quotationthus raises the question of whetherthe
spatial conception of ownership should dominate over some conception
thatrecognizes correlativeduties as between neighbors.
In fairness to Bramwell, he was only restating a propositionof the
House of Lords, and did not mount any systematicdefense of it. But, it is
useful to note how the question arose. Ibottson was a variationof Keeble
v. Hickeringill,105and addressedthe question whether a defendant,after
the plaintiff had lured his game away by placing corn on his own land,
was entitled to create a loud nuisance that caused damage to plaintiffs
own animals. It was held that it was not. The plaintiffs action was itself
no trespassand the wildlife on plaintiff's land was lawfully there, and was
not owned by the defendant.The defendantfor his part claimed that he
had invested great sums of money in cultivatingthe game thatthe plaintiff
had tempted away. It was in fact a case of conversion of labor without
there being a taking of propertyowned by the plaintiff, which is why no
action for trespassor conversion would lie. For Bramwell, the connection
between Ibottson and Chasmorewas that the noninvasive conduct of the
100. Id. at 786.
101. 159 Eng. Rep. 684 (Ex. 1865).
102. ABRAHAM, at 291.
103. 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (H.L.E. 1859).
104. 159 Eng. Rep. at 687. He thus repeatsthe query he had made during argument:"In
Chasemore v. Richards, the plaintiff was possessed of an undergroundspring which supplied his well, and the defendant, by digging a well on his land, dried up the plaintiffs
spring;but the only remedy the plaintiff had was to dig his well deeper."Id. at 686.
105. 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1706) (reportedK.B. 1809).
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plaintiff was not a wrong and thereforedid not justify the invasive conduct (the loud nuisance) done to prevent the plaintiff from keeping the
game. A neat connection indeed. Yet even here Bramwell saw that the
defendantwas not without sympathybut noted the ambiguityin the situation. "In my opinion that is a bad plea. There is nothing in point of law to
prevent the plaintiff from doing that which the plea alleges that he has
done. I say 'in point of law' because it cannotbe contendedfor a moment
that an action would lie against the plaintiff. As to the proprietyof such
conductbetween gentlemen and neighborsI say nothing."
But both Chasmoreand Ibottson are cases in which the live-and-letlive logic of Bamfordv. Turnleyshould at least have led him to question
the rigid nature of the outcome. Starting with Ibottson, the appeal to
neighborliness-which has been the linchpin of more modem analysis of
nuisance lawl06--could have led to the idea that both sides would have
been left betteroff if each could invest labor in improvinghis fields without having to fear that others would entice away their animals.The situation would thus be the converse of Bamfordin the sense that it would render certainnoninvasive forms of conduct actionable,just as Bamfordrendered certain forms of invasion nonactionable. But the principle is the
same in both cases: the deviation from strict autonomy rights improves
the situationof both parties, so that if one man owned both plots of land
he would think himself the gainer. This movement from invasive to noninvasive nuisances was in fact taken with respect to the rules of lateral
support,and Bramwell might have come out the otherway if he had taken
this possibility into account, althoughthe case is in trutha very close one
indeed on the merits.
The possible case of judicial modification is somewhat strongerin
the water cases, of which Chasmoreis only one.107To make matterssimple, assume first that the undergroundspring was only under the land of
these two landowners.A rule that allows one party to take what he will
and which forces the other to dig deeper could well leave both parties
worse off in response. Each digs in retaliationfor the other so in the end
both have spent more to get, arguably, a smaller amount of water than
each would have had if the wells had been kept at a more restraineddepth.
The difficulty here is anotherinstance of the familiarprisoner'sdilemma
game, in which each has the incentive to defect from the common solution
by digging deeper no matter whether the other owner decides to dig a
deep or a shallow well. In a two party situation, this poor outcome may
well be overcome by a contractwhereby each side agrees to limit its output. Reaching that agreementin this context could well be tricky, however, for it is difficult perhapsto define the ideal amountsof waterthat each
could take out, or to police the solution that is reached.
106. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls,40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
107. See also, Action v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843); Mayor of Bradfordv.
Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587.
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The situationbecomes still more tricky when more than two owners
tap into a common stream,for now the possibility of agreementis complicated by strategicbehavior.Modem studies suggest that once the number
of bargainersexceed five, the entire situation tends to unravel, and that
some state intervention,be it by common law rule or by regulation,may
be necessary to stop the mutualdestruction.l08Bramwell's individualism,
however, tended to blind him to these collective action problems. Yet,
even here we have to be cautious, for it is not clear that the simple existence of a collective action problemnecessarilycalls for a collective solution. Generalrules and institutionshave to be articulatedwith referenceto
general conditions, not just particular disputes. Underground water in
England is common, and most cases of unimpededdigging do not have
the untowardresults that they did in Chasemore v. Richards. So, it may
well not be worth the costs of putting a property system in place that
requiresmore complex administrativeenforcement.Here is not the place
to resolve that question, for the outcome is not what matters. The key
shortfall is that Bramwell did not see that his just compensationformula
of Bamfordin principlehad to be applied to this case before the analysis
was complete. If all owners are left betteroff afterthe administrativecosts
are absorbed, then there is just compensation for the restrictions that
makes the several owners operatelike a single owner who becomes a net
gainer. Bramwell had the tools to reach the correct outcome, but in his
brief exposition, he did not show an awarenessof the universalpower of
his general theory of nuisance law, or the extent to which they requirea
principledmodificationof the some portionsof laissez faire.
VI. Redistribution
The last issue on which Bramwell's laissez faire policy has been
subjectto criticism is the issue of redistribution.In dealing with this question, it is absolutely critical to note that committing one's self to state
solutions to collective action problemsdoes not commit one to redistribution in any way, shape, or form. Quite the opposite. The whole purposeof
the just compensation solutions to collective action problems is to leave
everyone better off than before and to encourage positive sum outcomes
that private bargainingcannot achieve. But the case for redistributionis
different, for here we must be willing to tolerate zero or even negative
sum games so long as the increasedutility to the poor is believed to offset
the reduction in social wealth needed to secure the redistribution.The
question is whether redistributionshould be adopted as a matterof state
policy once the collective action problem is solved. Sitting as a judge
within the English system, Bramwell would ordinarilyhave little opportunity to comment on a question of that magnitude,but as a pamphleteer,he
was certainlyin a position to let his views be know. And, in Economics v.
108. Gary Libecap & Steven Wiggins, Contractual Responses to Common Pool:
Prorationingof CrudeOil Production,74 AM. REV. ECON. 87 (1984).
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Socialism,109delivered before his Liberty and PropertyDefence League,
he was not shy about attackingthe redistributionthrough state coercion.
However, he does so in a way thatraises all the right questionson redistribution, and in an incrediblyshortcompass.
Here is a runningcommentaryon the high points of his speech. He
begins with the laissez faire credo - "Leave everyone to seek his own
happiness in his own way, providedhe does not injure others. Govern as
little as possible. Meddle not, interferenot, any more than you can help.
Trust to each man knowing his own interestbetter, and pursuingit more
earnestlythan the law can do it for him."o10Here, he has summarizedthe
basic tenets of the position: given self-knowledge, rely on self-interest
subject to a side constraintabout injury.Yet, this position still leaves him
uneasy, as well it should. "It is impossible not to have a doubt or misgiving, whether it is right that one man should have in an hour as many
pounds sterling as anotherhas in a year; whether one man should suffer
the extreme of misery and privation, and another have every, not only
necessity, but superfluity.It is a truthhard to believe; but I am satisfied
that it is a truth."111Points go to Bramwell for his candor. He does not
hide behind the learned economic propositionthat denies the possibility
of any interpersonalcomparisonsof utility. He admitsthat they were possible, and wishes thatincome could be more evenly distributed.
Bramwell then shies away from that comfortableconclusion. And he
has his reasons. "The great object of a society in this mattershould be to
make what the Americanscall the largest pile--the greatest quantitythat
exists is not desirable,but I say that in the attemptto bring it aboutby law
the pile will be reduced."ll2No hedging here, for he anticipatesthe entire
modem generationof rent seeking arguments."If you gave an equal share
to each, do you suppose--can anyone suppose-that each would work as
hardas he does now."113He understandsincentives as well. "Povertyand
misery shock us, but they are inevitable. They could be preventedif you
could prevent weakness, and sickness, and laziness, and stupidity, and
improvidence--not otherwise.To tell the weak, the lazy, and the improvident that they should not suffer for their faults and infirmitieswould but
encourage them to indulge in those faults and infirmities."ll4Bramwell
will not play the role of economist as false optimist. He does not think
that allowing private forces to operate in markets will yield the best
results in the best of all possible worlds. He takes a rather more pessimistic view of the potentialof (some) people, but thinksthat a system of
unqualified support would increase the very characteristicsthat no one
wants to see replicated.Many people today try to deny that the point is
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Economics v. Socialism: An Addressto the BritishAssociation (1888).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 13:27:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1994

FOR
ABRAMWELL
REVIVAL

285

true, or even to pretend that the effects are likely to be small, notwithstanding that in our own time we have seen an enormous expansion of
social supportservices go hand in hand with a decline in legitimatebirths
and educationalachievement.One does not have to be CharlesMurrayto
recognize that Bramwell's fears have been confirmed by our own bold
welfare experiment.
Yet, the incentive argumentis not universal."If it is said that poverty and misery may exist withoutfault in the sufferer,it is true.But it is but
rarely that they do, and the law cannot discriminate such cases."115So
once again, Bramwell does not make his case easier than it should be. He
concedes that there are cases of bad luck but insists that these cannot be
separatedfrom others by the law, and who can gainsay him after years of
eligibility requirementsthat never quite seem to work to control swollen
welfare rolls. "To attempt to remedy the disparity of conditions would
make the well-off poor, the poor not well off. Socialism is not good for
man till man himself is better."116
He instinctively stripsaway the utopian
about
efforts
at
equalizationof incomes. It will level downsentimentality
ward not upward-again correctin my view. And finally: "Privatecharity
may be useful, not in indiscriminategifts and doles-soup kitchens,coals,
flannel, and clothes given to all who apply-but in careful relief, given in
no case that is not investigated and seen to be deserving of help."117
Again, the strong sense that charity is not an unalloyed good, but should
be reserved for the deserving poor. His clear implicationis to do nothing
to help the others, althoughit seems equally clear that he would not prohibit others from extending charitythat he himself regardsas foolish. He
would just argueagainstit.
So what is wrong with this position? We could criticize Bramwell
for his bluntness, but not for his lack of clarity. We can say that it is not
fashionable to speak of individuals in less than glowing terms. After all,
the modem Republicanspirit is one that talks about full citizen participation in life, and conjures of images of people that are far removed from
the loutish descriptionthat Bramwell gives of some of his fellow citizens.
But for all that is he wrong, orjust tactless?
One way to answer this last question is to look at the refutationsof
laissez faire, writtenby those who understandwhat it means. My favorite
candidatefor this high office is Jacob Viner, whose intellectualhistory of
laissez faire, written toward the end of his distinguished career, takes
issues with the laissez faire conception that Bramwell defended.118It
would be ideal if Viner had respondedto Bramwell, but his targets were
political theorists of greater note: Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer and
FriedrichHayek, all of whom were in the Bramwell's intellectual tradi115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 14.
118. Jacob Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 45
(1960).
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tion. Viner is carefulnot to defeat a caricatureof the argument.
I will carefullyavoid using the termlaissez faire to mean what only unscrupulous
or ignorantopponentsof it and never its exponents make it mean, namely, philosophical anarchism,or opposition to any governmentalpower or activity whatsoever. I will in general use the term to mean what the pioneer systematic exponents of it, the Physiocratsand Adam Smith, argue for, namely, the limitationof
governmentactivity to the enforcementof peace and of "justice"in the restricted
sense of "commutativejustice," to defense againstforeign enemies, and to public
works regardedas essential and as impossible or highly improbableof establishment by private enterpriseor, for special reasons, unsuitableto be left to private
operation.119

Armed with this definition, Viner speaks both of the preventionof
the use of force, the enforcementof promises, and with just a little tugging and hauling, the provision of public goods. It is a good workingdefinition of the basic principles,one that leaves it to lawyers to work out the
details of consideration and contributory negligence. So, what are his
objections?One is that it might not allow for the preventionof monopoly,
with its negative implications for resource allocation. Fine. We can add
that to the list, so long as we are aware that there are many slips between
the identification of a problem and its proper containment. It is not as
though the history of antitrustenforcementnever took a wrong turn.
Yet, Viner's bottom line objection goes to the question of income
redistribution,on which Bramwellheld such negative views.
When economists discuss the workings of a free competitive market, they
agree thatthe existing patternof distributionof wealth, of income, and of individual knowledge, capacities, and skills, affects the price-structure.They presumably agree also that the price-structureof today affects the income-structureof
tomorrow.It is not appropriate,therefore,in a final appraisalfrom either an ethical or an economic-efficiency point of view of the mode of operationof an economic system, to consider the operationsof the marketon the assumptionthatthe
existing patternof income distributionis the consequence of a dispensation of
Providence. It is not reasonableto treat an existing income distribution,for the
purposeof analyzingthe market,as if it just "happened,"as if it were as independent of influence by the market and as incapable of influence on the market,
throughthe effect of aggregatehumanexercises of will and economic power, as
the Rocky Mountainsor stormsand earthquakesare free from humancontrol....
[T]he decline of laissez faire in England, and the growth there of systematic
state-interferencenot only with the economy as a whole, but with the free market,
came largely as the result of dissatisfactionwith the prevailing distribution-ofincome pattern.120

Fromthis Viner's reformfollows:
But a laissez faire programwhich confined its efforts to preservingor restoring
a free market,even a competitive market,while remainingsilent on or opposing
any proposalsfor adoptingnew or retainingold measuresin the area of distributive justice, would seem to me glaringly unrealisticwith respect to its chances of
political success, and highly questionablealso with respect to more exalted criteria of merit.121

So there you have it. Viner then proposes that academics and
119. Id. at 45.
120. Id. at 67-68.
121. Id. at 68.
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bureaucratsseek to mesh the operationof the free marketwith the forms
of income redistributionand offers reasons of both prudenceand fairness
to achieve that end. Accordingly, he speaks of his "Utopia"as the end to
which modernthinkersshould strive.122Withoutquestion,he (among others), has set the agenda for responsible reform in the past 30 years, and
the time has come to recognize that we cannot squarethe circle by reconciling freedom of contractwith income redistribution,and for just the reason that Bramwell said we cannot. Viner's proposal says nothing of private charity,but his redistributivistpolicies will help kill it off as government assumes more and more of the functions of supportthan used to be
done by private persons. Yet, the state cannot, as Bramwell said, distinguish nicely among the various claims of support.Viner's proposal does
not take into account the difficulties of misbehaviorby the poor, or, for
that matterthe rich, nor does it speak of how politics can convert noble
ideas into flawed programs. Nor does Viner point out a single form of
intervention,apartfrom those designed to secure public goods in nonredistributivefashion, that has actually achieved his goals. Even targets on
income equality are as elusive today as ever before. Yet with all this insistence on higher ends, the minimal functions for which we should depend
on the state are not so easily satisfied. One day's look at the morning
paper reveals an ever increasing concern with crime, and a grim realization that we are less able to fight infectious disease today than in years
past. The optimism of Viner and other responsible and compassionate
critics of laissez faire should give way to a more realistic sense of what
governmentscan and ought to do. The experiences of 100 years show that
Bramwell was right on the large questions of political philosophy and
economic outline even if he may have been wrong on small points of
detail. A Bramwell revival is long overdue indeed-and not just in the
common law courts.

122. Id. at 68-69.
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